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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-3(a) and
78-2-2(5).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does the proper standard of review for an extraordinary writ brought under Utah Rule

of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A) require that a judicial decision must be a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion in order for the court to overturn the decision? The correct standard of
review is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 2000 UT 58 Tf 15,
7P.3d783(Utah2000).
2.

Did the Deputies fail to timely file their grievance with the Utah County Career

Service Council within three months from the date of the occurrence as required by Utah
County Office of Personnel Management Rule and Regulation section VILE. 1.? (R 78,14121417, 1422-1430)
Statute of limitations questions are reviewed for correctness incorporating a clearly
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the
Respondents knew or should have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Reynolds.
2002 UT 24, Tf 32.
3.

Should this case have been remanded by the Court of Appeals to the District Court for

further proceedings on the merits? Whether a case should be remanded is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58^15,7 P.3d 783(Utah
2000).

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Section VII.E.l of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and
Regulations (PRR):
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to
the Career Service Council The employee must file a written notice with the
personnel director within three months from the date of the occurrence . . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A), 65B(d)(4):
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether
the respondent has regularly pursued its authority."
Utah Code Annotated 17-33-5(3):
(a)(i). The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county....
(b) The rules shall provide for:...
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, that
all successful candidates shall be required to meet in order to be eligible for
consideration for appointment or promotion;...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Court granted Petitioner Certiorari in this matter to review a decision of the Court
of Appeals which ruled that the Fourth District Court erred when it reversed the Utah County
Career Service Council and determined that Respondents failed to timely file personnel
grievances.
In 1991, Utah County Sheriffs Deputies Charles Martin and George Alexanderson
held the position of shift supervisor in the Utah County Jail. (R 1477 12) Mr. Martin had
worked with the Sheriffs Office since January of 1986 and was promoted to shift supervisor
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in June of 1987. (R1477 3,12) Mr. Alexanderson started with the Sheriffs Department on
February 8, 1988 and was promoted to shift supervisor in April of 1990. (R 1477 57) In
1991, Deputies Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Rod Robinson and John Gruenbaum were
also shift supervisors in the jail. (R 1476 57, 58) John Carlson was the lieutenant over the
jail, supervising three jail sergeants, Lana Morris (Johnson) and Dixie Jones (Branson),
(who supervised the shift supervisors) and the administrative sergeant, Mike Pientka. (R
1476 52-54, Exhibit L, R 850-852)
In 1991, the Utah County Office of Personnel Management (OPM) maintained job
descriptions for shift supervisor and jail sergeant.(Ex 1A, IB, R917,915) The Jail Policies
and Procedures Manual promulgated by the Sheriffs Department(JPPM) contained a duties
explanation for shift supervisor and jail sergeant/on line which corresponded with 1991
organizational charts. (Exhibits 1 A, IB, G, L, R833, 850-852) The JPPM regulates day to
day kinds of activities in the jail. Jail Policies and Procedures were operational and applied
to the jail only. (R 1477 129, 130). JPPM § 150 provided that promotion of jail staff
members would be based on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications and
competitive examinations, and would be carried out rationally impartially and according to
the law. Section 150.02 provided that all staff members desiring promotion in the jail would
be subject to a written examination, oral interview, review of evaluations and length of
service. Section 150.02.3 required three years of correctional experience including one year
as a shift supervisor for promotion to jail sergeant. In contrast, the 1991 OPM job
description minimum qualifications for jail sergeant were four years of experience as a
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deputy sheriff or detective, POST certification, qualifying score on the sergeant's
examination. (Exhibit IB, R 914)
In 1991, Utah County undertook a salary survey which was completed in July of that
year. The salary survey revised job descriptions after input from employees and consisted
of all of the job descriptions that were developed. (R1476 42,51) The salary survey did not
provide a job description for shift supervisor, which was eliminated. (Exhibit 4, R 910,
Exhibit 5, R 909) Pre-salary survey, employment in the jail was on a career track basis. Postsalary survey employment in the jail was not. Because shift supervisors were intermediate
positions, not department-wide sanctioned and confined to specific areas with specific needs,
the position did not lend itself well to career opportunities and the Sheriff determined it
would be better if first line supervisors were all of the rank of sergeant. (R 1477 109-111)
The Sheriff, as a result, eliminated the position of shift supervisor, reclassifying shift
supervisors to corrections specialists. Promotions to sergeant were then made subsequent
to the reclassification under a competitive process. (R 1477 112) The Sergeant/Jail
Operations post salary surveyjob description dated 12-23-91 was retroactive to July 22,1991
and required as minimum qualifications "Current POST Certification.

Current CPR

Certification, Requires BS degree and three years job related work experience." (R 911 -912,
Exhibit 1C)
As a result of the reorganization in the Sheriffs Department after the salary survey,
the separate career path that had been pursued in the jail was eliminated.

Thereafter

sergeants could be assigned anywhere within the Department at Sheriff Bateman's discretion.
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(R 1477 124-126)

In the 1991 sergeants' selection process, Mr. Alexanderson was

considered for training, patrol, operations, civil and corrections sergeant's positions. Mr.
Martin was considered for training and corrections sergeant's positions. (Exhibit O, R 856860,1477 113) The selection process for sergeants' promotions in 1991 consisted of resume
review and promotability assessments completed by all deputy sheriffs who were of the rank
of sergeant or above for each of the candidates who were qualified. (R 1477 114, 115)
After the shift supervisor position was eliminated, shift supervisor experience was no longer
required for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R 1477 140)
In December, 1991, shift supervisors Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks, and Patrol
Deputy Dennis Howard, were promoted to Sergeant in the Jail Sgt. Pientka continued as a
jail sergeant. Shortly after the December 1991 promotions, Mr. Alexanderson transferred to
Patrol and Mr. Martin transferred to Animal Control. (R 18, 20, 21, 35, 74)
Mr. Martin did not believe Bonnie Herkimer was peace officer certified, and was not
sure whether Mark Binks was peace officer certified when promoted in 1991. He did not
believe Dennis Howard was a shift supervisor for a year and did not have a college degree.
(R1477 30). On paper shift supervisors were reclassified back to corrections specialists or
deputy sheriff III and then promoted after being reclassified. (R 1477 31). Mr. Martin
learned that Herkimer and Binks had been promoted to sergeant when he saw them wearing
sergeant stripes in December of 1991. (R 1477 32). Mr. Martin applied for sergeant
positions four times since 1992, the most recent being 1996. (R 1477 36). In the last two
years before 1997 Mr. Alexanderson did not participate in sergeant's promotions as the
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sergeant's promotions were in all likelihood were going to remain in the jail the rest of their
career. (R1477,77-78). Mr. Alexanderson alleged Mark Johnson was promoted to sergeant
in the Civil Division, in 1990 or 1991, when he saw his sergeant stripes. Rex Murdock in
Animal Control was promoted without any register or open test, Larry Patterson was
promoted in October of 1991 to sergeant in Emergency Management, Tom Wroe the County
Fire Marshall, and Kirby Packham were promoted to sergeant. Yvette Rice was promoted
to sergeant in 1994 without open competitive testing. (R 1477 85-91) Mike Swenson was
paid at a Grade 20 the same as sergeants for supervising inmates on work projects.
The Deputies were on the register for the December 1992 jail sergeant position.
(Exhibit 16 R 874). Mr. Alexanderson tested for a sergeant's position in 1993, Mr. Martin
didnotapply. (R1477 141, Exhibit 6). In December 1994 most eligible deputies requested
the Sheriff promote without testing. Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for this test because he
did not agree with it, Mr. Martin did and signed the waiver. (Exhibit I, R 836-837, R 1477
150-151). Both Deputies participated in the 1995 sergeant promotional process. (Exhibit 17,
R1477 151-152). Mr. Martin participated in 1996 but Mr. Alexanderson did not. (R900).
The Deputies withdrew from the 1997 promotions after filing grievances with the Utah
County Career Service Council. (R 1477 54,889)
On December 17, 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Batemai] and raised the
following issues with Sheriff Bateman in printed outline form. Shift supervisors were
promised sergeants positions and should have been placed in sergeants' positions before
subordinates had the opportunity to test; corporal5s(shift supervisors) were promised upgrade
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to sergeant and were already doing sergeant work; Shift supervisors were asked to vote on
accepting the rank of sergeant without a related pay raise in a shift supervisor meeting; Mark
Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Johnson, and Art Adcock were grandfathered into sergeant's
rank which should have been the case until all corporal's in good standing were upgraded;
Written Jail Policy 150.02.3.b mandated one year shift supervisor experience as a
requirement for eligibility for promotion to sergeant; Corporal's were asked to stop wearing
rank insignia thereby negating promotions without cause; Subordinate's of those corporals
were then promoted to ranking positions over the corporal's; the corporals were demoted
without cause; apparent discrimination towards corporals doing identical job descriptions
passed over with bias possibly based on likes/dislikes, favoritism, religious intolerance,
administrative egocentrism, and undisclosed subjective criteria, or whimsical scrutiny. They
questioned whether other qualified personnel were considered when Yvette Rice was
i

appointed. They also alleged "inconsistencies" such as fluctuating eligibility requirements,
promoting Yvette Rice and Pat Wroe with the uni-division experience and not inter division
experience; supervisors telling candidates promotional lists would be active for one year
from testing not the end of one half year due to fiscal calendar year change; varying
promotional lists with varying candidate placement; perpetration of extreme ethical violations
during testing. (R 791-792)
Sheriff Bateman by letter dated December 30, 1996 responded to the December 17,
1996 meeting with the Deputies. Sheriff Bateman said he found evidence of dissatisfaction
with departmental promotional policy that is consistent with the issues raised under
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inconsistencies. (R 340-341)
The Deputies in January of 1997 filed a grievance with the Utah County Career
Service Council(CSC). Pursuant to CSC rules the parties submitted Pre-hearing Outlines for
a pre- hearing to establish ground rules, define issues, identify witnesses and ascertain
stipulations of fact. Utah County's Pre-hearing Outline alleged that the Deputies grievance
was not timely filed. (R 78, 1422-1430) At the pre-hearing the CSC, without the benefit of
a formal motion from the County and/or briefing by the parties, requested the parties to
briefly address whether the filing of the grievance was done in a timely manner and whether
it should be heard. This question was addressed by the parties before the CSC along with the
merits of the case. (R 734-758) By letter dated April 7,1997 the CSC confirmed the CSCs
decision to proceed in hearing the Deputies grievance on April 23, 1997. (R 821) Utah
County filed a formal Motion to Dismiss based on the Deputies failure to timely file an
appeal to the CSC on April 17,1997. (R 1412-1417) The Deputies did not file a response.
At the April 23, 1997 hearing, the parties addressed the County's motion. After argument
the CSC stated:
The Council rules that it is timely filed. We want to be formally on the record
and we wanted the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the
filing was December 17,1996. It wasfiled—itwas a 90 day period to file and
it was filed January 10th with Marilyn (inaudible) personnel director so that
matter is no longer at issue. (R 1476 33)
The CSC heard evidence and arguments in this matter on April 23,1997 and May 29,
1997. (R 1476, 1477) The Council took this matter under advisement and by letter dated
June 30,1997 ruled that the Deputies should not be reinstated to the rank of sergeant because
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they never achieved that rank. The CSC, however, recommended that both be promoted to
the sergeants rank effective immediately, pay at the sergeants level retroactive to December
9, 1991 when the first promotions to sergeants became effective after the shift supervisor
position was eliminated and that the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was
the date that should drive the time for filing. (R 1142,1143) Utah County filed a Petition
for Extraordinary Relief in District Court on July 15,1997. Thereafter, the Deputies filed
a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the CSC decision was not a final appealable order. (R 72) By
Order dated October 27, 1997 the Court denied the Deputies Motion to Dismiss, but
remanded the case to the CSC for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 118-120)
The Remand Order included direction to the CSC. In Part C of the Order it stated:
That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Council may among other things as it in its discretion may elect:
... v. Make such changes, additions or modifications to his decision as it may
deem necessary or desirable; and
vi. Do such other things and take such further actions as it may deem
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the
proceedings for eventual review by this Court. (R798, 799)
Pursuant to CSC request, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law on May 8,1998. On May 26,1998 the parties filed objections to the others' proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R 1205-1377) Mr. Ryan Beuhring's (the final
CSC member who heard the evidence) CSC term expired at the end of June 1998. Mr.
Beuhring continued to serve on the CSC until his replacement was appointed in the fall of
1998, but the CSC had still not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R 221,222)
By memorandum dated November 6, 1998, the CSC informed the parties to submit
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briefs by November 20, 1998 in order to issue findings before the end of the year. (R 814)
At the Deputies' request, the deadline in which to file the additional briefs was extended
several times to the 22nd day of March, 1999 while the Deputies sought replacement counsel.
(R 784-788) Instead of filing an additional brief in March, the Deputies filed an Objection
to Filing Further Arguments. (R1209) Utah County's Memorandum addressing the merits
of the case was filed March 22, 1999. (R 1204) By ruling dated November 22, 1999 the
CSC ruled that this case should be heard de novo in the district court. (R1141) Utah County
in response thereto filed a Motion to Reconsider before the CSC which the Deputies
opposed. (R 1159, 1154) Without ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, and pending the
hearing of a district court Order to Show Cause in April of 2000 regarding compliance with
the district court's remand order, the CSC issued a ruling dismissing the Deputies' grievance
as untimely. (R 1137, 1128) In the district court, the Deputies objected to the CSC ruling
which dismissed their claim. The parties briefed and argued the Deputies' objection which
was sustained on September 12, 2000. The parties briefed Utah County's Petition for
Extraordinary Relief. (R 243) Before the District Court, the Deputies for the first time
argued the discovery rule to support the untimely filing of the Deputies' grievance. (R 362)
After briefing and argument, by Memorandum Decision dated September 27, 2001, the
district court accorded the Career Service Council broad deference in its findings of fact, but
reviewed the Council's conclusions of law for correctness. (R 1460) The district court
determined that the Deputies' claims were barred as a matter of law by the statute of
limitations. (R 1454) The court entered an order granting the Petition for Extraordinary
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Relief, reversing the CSC, and dismissing the Deputies5 claim for failure to timely file their
grievances. (R 1462) Respondents appealed this matter and the Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court holding that the Deputies' grievances were timely filed. Utah County v.
George Alexanderson and Charles Martin 2003 UT App 153. This Court granted Petitioner's
request for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The decision of the CSC is reversible for an abuse of discretion under URCP
65B(d)(2)(A). The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the Deputies
is a standard applicable to extraordinary writs only when the writ would have the effect of
circumventing a statutorily prohibited appeal. To apply the gross and flagrant standard to all
extraordinary writs renders the trial court essentially unreviewable and allows trial and
appellate courts to ignore the law. This deprives litigants of notice of the law to be applied
and an opportunity for a fair hearing based on the law in violation of Utah and federal due
process clauses and the Utah open courts provision.
Other significant reasons to apply an abuse of discretion standard in this case are that
there is little guidance defining a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion, the gross and
flagrant standard prohibits review of whether the law was correctly applied as required by
the URCP 65(B)(d)(4) inquiry into whether the trial court regularly pursued its authority, the
CSC is not a body entitled to deference, municipal employment decisions are also reviewed
by an abuse of discretion standard, reviewing for a mistake of law will foster confidence in
the judicial system, and review of a volunteer, lay body such as the CSC should be more
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rather than less stringent.
Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations required the Deputies to file a
grievance with the CSC within three months of the occurrence of their grievance in 1991.
The Deputies failed to do so, and rely on the discovery rule to excuse their failure to timely
file. The relevant inquiry to determine this question is what the jail sergeant minimum
qualifications were in 1991 and when did the deputies discover they were not promoted and
someone else was. To invoke the discovery rule it is necessary for the Deputies to show that
they did not know and could not have reasonably known of their cause of aiction within the
limitation period. From the Deputies5 and their counsel's argument and testimony before the
CSC, it is clear that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action when
they were not promoted to sergeant in December, 1991, that someone else was promoted, and
that the Deputies believed they were the only ones qualified for promotion. The Deputies
were on actual if not inquiry notice of all the key facts in 1991 when they found out they were
not promoted. The Deputies had access to all Personnel job descriptions and rules and
regulations and all Sheriff Department manuals in addition to participating in the promotion
processes. For the next five years the Deputies failed to pursue their claim with reasonable
diligence. The Deputies cannot place any alleged promise of Sheriff Bateman that "it would
be made right" within any limitation period upon which they could reasonably rely in not
pursuing a grievance within the limitation period. The Deputies do not allege any facts
relevant to a prima facie showing of misleading conduct or fraudulent concealment of key
facts-the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant, who was promoted, and whether the
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promoted sergeants met minimum job qualifications. In fact shift supervisor experience and
peace officer certification were not minimum requirements for promotion to jail sergeant in
1991 and the deputies promoted to jail sergeant without these qualifications met all jail
sergeant minimum qualifications.
The discovery rule, exceptional circumstances prong is also not applicable as this case
does not concern the performance of a technical service by Utah County and the prejudice
to Utah County resulting from the passage of time from unavailable witnesses, faded
memories, and loss of evidence is greater than the hardships imposed by the application of
the three month limitation of actions.
Utah County is not estopped from claiming the limitation of actions as no promises
of making it right, or any promises of promoting the Deputies were made, if at all, during or
after a limitation period expired. Reliance on any such promise would be unreasonable in
any event as promoting the Deputies outside of a promotional process would violate merit
principles which require considering all qualified applicants for a promotion.
Finally if the Court determines the deputies timely filed their grievance, this case
should be remanded to determine this case on the merits. The only issue before the Court of
Appeals was the limitation of actions. Any other statements regarding merit principles in the
district court memorandum decision were dicta, unnecessary to the decision of the case and
concerned promotional testing procedural issues not determinative of this case. The fact that
this Court considers the case as coming directly from the CSC and affords the other appellate
courts no deference does not change the rules concerning what is appealed from a final order.
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If the court determines the entire case was before the court of appeals this ruling should be
given prospective effect only and this matter remanded nonetheless.
Failure to remand would also deprive Petitioner of its day in court contrary to Utah
and federal due process clauses and the Utah open courts provisions. The failure of any court
to determine the 1991 minimum qualifications for jail sergeant prevents Petitioner from
having its claims and defenses properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and
law.

If the Deputies grievance is timely, the Court should remand this case for a

determination of jail sergeant minimum qualifications or in the alternative determine this
issue.
ARGUMENT
I

THE DECISION OF THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL IS REVERSIBLE
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION1
County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is brought under Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure(URCP) 65B(d). It states in relevant part,
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether
the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." URCP 65B(d)(2)(A), 65B(d)(4).
The relevant inquiry is whether the CSC exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion.
Historically, review of a Rule 65B(d) abuse of discretion included review for a
1

The arbitrary and capricious standard advanced by the Deputies below does not
apply to this case. The arbitrary and capricious standard and direct appeal provisions of
UCA 17-33-4(l)(d) were enacted April 30, 2001 after this case was appealed to the
District Court and were not argued by the Deputies to the District Court See 2001
Amendment Notes to UCA 17-33-4.
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mistake of law, applying a correction of error standard. Salt Lake Child and Family Clinic
v, Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818
P.2d 23,26,27(Utah App. 199 l)(Involving Salt Lake County Career Service Council stating
"Since the review performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a review of the entire
record, it is the same review that would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a
direct appeal."). Appeal of a CSC decision under URCP 65B(d)(2) was reviewed for an
abuse of discretion in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23(Utah App. 1991).
The Tolman court stated that an abuse of discretion
. . . is a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an improvident exercise of
discretion; an error of l a w — An abuse of discretion therefore, is an act by a tribunal,
not a standard of review in and of itself. A reviewing court discovers such acts by
applying varying standards of review depending on the error alleged....
If, however, a party claims that a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of discretion
and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error standard, giving
no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no deference to such
decisions because we are in as good a position as a tribunal to determine the law.
Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion
as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law. In essence a reviewing court
never overturns a lower tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id, at
26, 27.
Below, the Court Of Appeals ruled that the CSC may be overturned only for a gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion. This is an unwarranted, ill-advised extension of URCP
65B(d)2(A) and Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995). In Renn.
the plaintiff sought an Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to compel the State
Board of Pardons to advance his parole hearing date because UCA §77-27-5(3) prohibits an
appeal from Board of Pardon's actions. This Court ruled in Renn that
15

Because the legislature has directed that there be no right of appeal from Board of
Pardons actions . . . mandamus and certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a
statutory appeal. Nevertheless, where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving appropriate
deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of
Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary
writ. Id,, at 683, 684.
Under Renn, a statutory bar to appeal is a necessary prerequisite to applying the gross and
flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness inquiry. Since Renn was
decided, the Court of Appeals has employed the Renn inquiry in several cases requiring a
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion prior to overturning any decision, judicial or otherwise,
under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A).
In State v. Stirba. 972 P. 2d 918 (Utah App. 1998), the state sought to compel Judge
Stirba to order over $9,000 in restitution to a crime victim. UCA §77-18-8- L (2)(Supp 1998)
precluded the state from appealing Judge Stirba5 s restitution order and the court found that
the state may not use a writ of mandamus to circumvent this restriction. Stirba, at 920. The
Court however included a statement that exceeded the holding of Renn by stating that an
"abuse of discretion for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden
variety of abuse of discretion featured in routine appellate review", Stirba, at 922. This
statement opened the door to apply the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard to all
65B(d)(2)(A) writs regardless of whether the writ is sought in a circumstance when an appeal
is prohibited by statute. Stirba noted that although the lower court inconectly interpreted a
restitution statute, it was a simple mistake of law that did not qualify as the kind of gross and
flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue, IdL, at 923,
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thereby preventing any meaningful review of a lower tribunals application of the law.
While Stirba held that a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind of gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue, the Stirba
court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the fact that
. . . this proceeding has the same characteristics and seeks the same review and relief,
as a statutory appeal from Judge Stirba's restitution order. Hence, to avoid
transforming this action into an impermissible appeal, we must deny the state's
request for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) Writ of Mandamus ... Based on our determination that
Judge Stirba [did not abuse] her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with
our holding that the state's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal, the state's
Petition for Extraordinary Writ is hereby denied. Id. at 923.
The Renn gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard should only be applied when an
appeal is statutorily prohibited. In reviewing this matter the Court should engage in standard
appellate review.
In the instant matter, the Court of Appeals has applied the gross and flagrant abuse
of discretion standard to a case where appeal under Rule 65B was provided by statute. When
Petitioner filed the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in 1997, the County Personnel
Management Act directed that"... a right of appeal to the district court under the provisions
ofthe Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure shall not be abridged." U.C.A. 17-33-4(l)(Supp. 1997).
The instant action is undertaken pursuant to a statutory right of appeal and the Renn standard
advanced by the Deputies is not applicable.
The application of the Renn standard to all writs sought under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A)
violates the principles of Due Process, Fundamental Fairness and access to the courts by
allowing a court, even though it recognizes the law was misapplied, to disregard the law
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because a mistake is not gross and flagrant, thus depriving litigants of notice of the law to
be applied and a fair hearing by allowing trial and reviewing courts to ignore the law. Both
the due process clause of article I section 7 and the open courts provision of article I section
11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants will have their day in court. Miller v.
USAACas.Ins.Co.. 2002 UT 6 ^ 38,44 P.3d 663,673. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution;
United States Constitution 5th and 14th Amendments. Article I section 11 of the Utah
Constitution provides
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
The court's policy is to "resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in
court on the merits of a controversy."

Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control

Commission, 657 P.2d 1293,1296 (Utah 1997) (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601,
603 (Utah 1976)) Inherent in due process protections are adequate notice and a right to a fair
hearing. No party to a legal action can have adequate notice and a fair hearing if the tribunal
or reviewing court can misapply or ignore the law without any possibility of a meaningful
review or correction. Under the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard, litigants cam
never have fair notice of the law to be applied. Litigants should be able to make decisions
based on the law and expect that a reviewing court would always apply the law to the matter
reviewed, whether a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion or a "simple'9, "garden variety"
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error of law. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard applied across the board
deprives litigants of any certainty that they may make and evaluate decisions and actions
based on the law and that their decisions will be evaluated under the law by reviewing courts.
To allow otherwise erodes the confidence of litigants in the judicial system and prevents the
operation of the basic concept that "At a minimum, a day in court means that each party shall
be afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them properly
adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller, TJ 41. Both the due
process clause of Article I Section 7 and the open courts provision of Article I Section 11 of
the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants will have this open day in court. The analysis
to determine a denial of a day in court is the same under the due process and open courts
provisions. Miller, 1f 38. Because the key issue of minimum qualification for jail sergeant
has not been decided to date by any court, there has been no proper adjudication on the merits
according to the facts and the law.
Stirba and Renn also do not provide any guidance or rules to define a gross and
flagrant abuse of discretion. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard is contrary
to the clear abuse of discretion language of Rule 65B(d) and prevents any meaningful review
of the CSC's application of the law.
The Stirba holding also prevents the review required by Rule 65B(d)(4) which
requires that a review of judicial proceedings "shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." Such a determination includes
whether the lower court correctly applied the law. Explaining what it means for the Public
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Service Commission to regularly pursue its authority, this Court stated in Utah Dept. of
Admin. Serv. V. Pub. Serv. Com'n 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983)
In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of general questions oflaw, this Court
applies a correction-of-error standard with no deference to the expertise of the
Commission. General questions of law include interpretation of the United States
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and interpretation of the Utah Constitution and
the Acts of the Legislature (except those defined below as special laws). This is the
type of review specified in the first sentence of the statute quoted above, i.e., whether
the Commission has "regularly pursued its authority" and whether it has violated any
constitutional or statutory rights of the petitioner.
This statement is in accordance with this Court's statement following a quotation of Rule
65B(e)(4), now 65B(d)(4), "Since the issue here involves the interpretation and application
of a statute, the trial court's legal conclusion is granted no particular deference but is
reviewed for correctness." Frederick, at 1019. In this instance, the gross and flagrant abuse
of discretion standard prevents the review required to determine whether the CSC regularly
pursued its authority and should not be applied.
Unlike the Renn and Stirba, which involved decisions of restitution and parole dates,
there is no similar grant of discretion and deference to the CSC. The CSC is not a policy
making body entitled to deference. Utah County is the body charged with the administration
of the County Personnel Management Act. See UCA 17-33-5, 17-33-7. In this case the
traditional abuse of discretion standard is best to allow courts to redress employer and
employee grievances.
The Stirba decision also results in a situation where application of the law by
municipal civil service commissions on municipal employment decisions would be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion, correction of error standard, Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv,
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Comm'n 2000 UT App 235,^|15, while counties would be held to the Stirba interpretation
of an abuse of discretion which prohibits review of CSC decisions for a misapplication of
the law. There is no reason that the standard employed in reviewing municipal personnel
decisions should be any different than county personnel decisions.
Review of Rule 65B matters for a mistake of law will grant litigants the confidence
that their decisions can be made and will be reviewed according to the law. Otherwise a
lower tribunal's application of the law is essentially unaccountable under Rule 65B, opening
the door for uncertainty and eroding confidence in the judicial system. Oversight of an
appointed, volunteer, lay body such as the CSC should be more, rather than less, stringent
to adequately protect the rights of the parties.
n

THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review to be applied by the Court in reviewing statue of limitations

questions was recently stated in Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, ^ 32. Therein this Court
stated:
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the
discovery rule are questions of law which we review for correctness. See, e.g.,
Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C. 2000 UT 84, ^10, 12 P.3d 577;
Clineer v. Rightly. 791 P2d 868, 869-70(Utah 1990). However, the
applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also involves
a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which a person reasonably
should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of
fact. See, e.g., Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah. 902 P2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) (The point at
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal
injury is a question of fact.) Accordingly, we review for correctness
incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual
determination of when the Plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal
injuries.
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Ill

UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL JOB DESCRIPTIONS SET THE MINIMUM
QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT AND DID NOT INCLUDE POST
PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION OR SHIFT SUPERVISOR
EXPERIENCE
Before considering the limitation of actions issues in this case it is necessary to

determine the minimum requirements for promotion to jail sergeant that were in effect in
1991. The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant are the key factual determination in
deciding when the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action under the
discovery rule. This case turns on a determination of the 1991 jail sergeant minimum
qualifications. The only finding that could support the CSC award of back pay would be thait
the Deputies were the only candidates that met the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant
in 1991. Marshaling the facts regarding this issue is difficult in that no tribunal including the
CSC to date has determined the 1991 jail sergeant minimum qualifications. Marshaling is
also clouded by the fact that the CSC made inconsistent rulings on the Deputies requested
relief. The CSC declined to order retroactive reinstatement to sergeant becaiuse the Deputies
never made sergeant, but then ordered back pay to December 1991 and immediate promotion.
Necessary to the back pay order is a finding that the Deputies were the only candidates that
met minimum requirements for jail sergeant. Marshaling facts as though the CSC had
determined that the JPPM set minimum requirements for jail sergeant in 1991 and that the
Deputies were the only qualified candidates follows.
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A FINDING THAT THE JPPM SET
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991 AND
THE DEPUTIES WERE THE ONLY QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.
Deputy Martin testified he was category I or peace officer certified when he
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commenced working with Utah County in January of 1986. (R1477 p 11) Deputy Martin
was also corrections certified.

(R1477 p 11) Deputy Martin was promoted to shift

supervisor on June 24, 1987. (R1477 p 12) Deputy Martin was a shift supervisor for
approximately four years. (R1477p 16) Based on'^seemingly assurances" throughout the
years prior where they had talked about upgrading the shift supervisor position to sergeants,
i

Deputy Martin assumed that when the first news came that the shift supervisor position was
going to be eliminated, that those serving in that capacity would be promoted to sergeants.
(R1477 p 19-20) At the time of the 1991 promotions, the Deputies felt that they were as
qualified, if not more qualified, than Mark Binks and Bonnie Herkimer, inasmuch as the
Deputies were peace officer certified.

(R1477 p 21) Deputy Martin understood the

minimum qualifications for jail sergeant for the 1991 promotions were shift supervisor for
one year, off probation, peace officer certification, knowledgeable enough or proven
competent and a college degree was required for hiring at the jail. Deputy Martin understood
the JPPM § 127.03 to be a description of the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant in 1991
when Herkimer and Binks were promoted as jail sergeants, which indicates jail sergeant on
line would have category I police status. (R1477p23,R833) JPPM § 150.02 required three
years of correctional experience including one year as a shift supervisor for promotion to
sergeant. (R1477 p 24, R834) Deputy Martin understood this policy to be applicable in
December, 1991 when Herkimer, Binks, and Howard were promoted. (R1477 p 25)
Because a college degree is the minimum hiring requirement for a corrections specialist at
the jail, Deputy Martin assumed that a college degree was required for any position in the
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jail. (R1477 p 25, 26) Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks were not POST [peace officer]
certified when they were promoted to sergeant. Dennis Howard was POST [peace officer]
certified because he was in patrol. (R1477 p 30) Deputy Howard was not a shift supervisor
for a year prior to promotion. Deputy Martin did not know if Deputy Howard had a college
degree. (R1477 p 30) Deputy Martin had served as a shift supervisor for a year, had a
college degree, and was category I POST certified, and had three years experience at the
sheriffs office in 1991. (R1477 p 30-31) In 1997, when testimony was taken on this ceise,
the jail policy regarding shift supervisor experience had not been rescinded. (R1477 p 37)
George Alexanderson testified that he was promoted to shift supervisor in April of
1990. Dennis Howard, who ranked third in the 1991 jail sergeant promotions, did have
correctional experience, but did not have a college degree and had not been a shift
supervisor. (R1477 p 64-67, 72) Sergeant Pientka went on his own time to POST to get
certified as a peace officer while a shift supervisor. He did this to be deemed eligible while
a shift supervisor for a promotion. (R1477 p 73) Sheriffs Policy and Procedure 340 lists
shift supervisor as fifth in eight ranks between Sheriff and deputy sheriff I. (R855)
Numerous individuals failed to qualify for peace officer certification during their six months
probation and were left in their positions without being returned to their previous position.
(R1477 p 100) The sheriffs policy and the jail manual were not revised to show that the
rank of shift supervisor was eliminated. (R1477 p 104)
The minimum qualifications for a shift supervisor were four years of college, thirty
units of which must have been in sociology, psychology, or closely related field, and two
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years of full time employment as a corrections specialist or any equivalent combination of
education and experience. (R 917, Exhibit 1A)
JPPM §127.03 for Jail Sergeant On Line states:
"A.

General Classification: Deputy Sheriff
1.

B.

Category One Police Status." (R833 Exhibit G)

CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
A FINDING THAT THE PRR SET THE MINIMUM
QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991.

Deputy Martin was promoted to shift supervisor at the same time as Bonnie Herkimer
and Mark Binks on June 24, 1987. In September or October of 1991, Deputy Martin was
told there were no more shift supervisors by Captain Quarnberg and Lieutenant Carlson.
(R1477 17) Around the end of December, 1991 Capt. Quarnberg and Lt. Carlson came in
with new job descriptions. Captain Quarnberg said you can stop wearing your two stripes and
promoted Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks. (R1477 18) Deputy Alexanderson made plans,
saw this coming, when they started talking about just promoting two sergeants and made
arrangements to transfer to patrol. (R1477 18) Deputy Martin was verbally told for months
prior that the position of shift supervisor was going to be eliminated. (R1477 18) Exhibit
IB was the Personnel Office jail sergeant's job description in effect before the salary survey
and new job descriptions were issued around the time of the 1991 promotions. (R1477 28)
Minimum qualifications on Exhibit IB, required four years of experience as a deputy sheriff
or detective, POST certification, qualifying score on sergeants9 examination. (R 914) The
post salary survey sergeant jail operations9 job description required current POST

25

certification and current CPR certification, BS degree, including 30 hours in psychology,
sociology, interpersonal relations, or closely related field, and three years job related work
experience with demonstrated competence. (R 911) It was announced in a shift supervisor
meeting that there were now no longer any shift supervisors. (R1477 39) The position of
shift supervisor was eliminated after the salary survey. (R1477 44-45) Deputy Martin was
allowed to receive his POST corrections certification after he was hired by Utah County.
(R1477 46-47) Sergeants who were hired in the jail were allowed to qualify for peace officer
POST certification during their sergeant probationary period. (R1477 47-48) On August 15,
1991 Sheriff Bateman issued a memorandum to all employees which indicated that all shift
supervisor positions are to be eliminated, that shift supervisors will be reclassified to deputy
sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated loss of pay. (R 909) When it was
announced that the shift supervisor position was eliminated, Deputy Martin did not
understand that everyone who was a shift supervisor would automatically be made a sergeant.
(R1477 51-52)
Deputy Alexanderson testified he received his corrections certification to work in the
Utah County Jail after he was hired. (R1477 61) The Sheriffs Office policy is to allow
promoted individuals to obtain their peace officer certification during probationary periods,
with the understanding that the person gets the certification while on a probationary period.
(R1477 99-100)
Sheriff David Bateman testified that the 1991 salary survey surveyed all positions
within Utah County and made recommendations regarding salary and job descriptions. The
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shift supervisor position was eliminated as line supervisor positions were recommended to
be at the sergeant level, rather than intermediate positions that were not department wide.
(R1477 110) When the shift supervisor position was eliminated, shift supervisors were
reclassified and subsequent promotions to sergeant occurred. (R1477 111-112) In every
case, the hiring roster for sergeants' promotions was approved by the personnel director as
having met merit principles. (R1477 116) Before the 1991 sergeants'promotions, all of the
positions and the candidates who applied were reviewed by personnel, which determined
who was eligible for promotion to sergeant. (R1477 117-118) From 1991 to the time of the
hearing of this matter, peace officer certification was not required prior to testing for a
sergeants'position in the jail. (R1477 122-123) Economics prohibited Sheriff Bateman
from training deputies serving in the jail as both corrections and peace officers. (R1477 124)
In 1991, with the creation of the new organizational structure resulting from the salary
survey, the separate career path that had existed in the jail was eliminated and a sergeant
could be assigned anywhere within the department at the sheriffs discretion. (R1477 124,
125,137) In 1991, had the separate career path philosophy in the jail continued, only those
people that were in the jail would have been allowed to test for jail positions. (R1477 125)
Deputies were able to apply for any sergeant's position as long as they met minimum
requirements. The individual would be required to, within the probationary period, achieve
necessary POST certification levels whether it be corrections or peace officer. (R1477 126)
The JPPM is a manual that was prepared to insure that the jail was in compliance with
state standards and regulates the day to day activities in the jail. Portions of the County Rules
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and Regulations were included for clarification, but it is just a guide. The JPPM is
operational and applies to the jail only. (R1477 129) The JPPM and the Sheriffs Policies
and Procedures are advisory to be used to help define and to know what's expected in terms
of interpreting county rules and regulations. (R1477 129-130) County Rules and Regulations
are adopted by and promulgated through the personnel office by the county commission. The
County Rules and Regulations impact the Sheriffs department manuals, which are advisory
and are looked at as being of assistance, being interpretive in nature of the County Rules and
Regulations. (R1477 130) Personnel office announcements are part of the Rules and
Regulations and impact what the Sheriffs Office does with respect to Sheriffs Policies and
Procedures. (R1477 130) The Sheriffs Department manuals have not been updated to the
extent they ought to be or what Sheriff Bateman would like to have them be because Sheriff
Bateman did not have the time. (R1477 131) The sergeant's job announcements that came
out of the personnel office stated that sergeants could be certifiable or receive their peace
officer certification after promotion. (R1477 131) After the elimination of the shift
supervisor position, Sheriff Bateman did not consider shift supervisor experience as a
requirement for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R1477 139-140) Determinations regarding
promotion candidate eligibility were made by the personnel office. (R1477 140-141, Exhibit
6) The controlling document between jail policy, sheriff department policy, and county
regulations, are the county regulations. (R1477 160) A college degree was not required for
promotion to sergeant from 1991 on. (R1477 167)
Deputy Mark Binks, a shift supervisor in 1991, did not believe that all shift
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supervisors would automatically be made sergeants. He was advised that the shift supervisor
position would probably be done away with and that shift supervisors were eligible to test
for sergeant. Deputy Binks did not have an expectation that he would be made a sergeant.
It was brought up that shift supervisors were in a good position of being promoted. (R1477
183-184)
The sergeant's job description from the salary survey, Exhibit 1-C, was retroactive
back to the implementation of the reclassification study on July 22, 1991. (R1476 49)
In a shift supervisor meeting on September 6, 1991, Capt. Quarnberg announced,
There are now no shift supervisors. Everyone will remain where they are for now.
Between now and October 1st, decisions will be made about how to implement the
three new categories of probation, training, and competency. The Sheriff is currently
rewriting the lieutenants' and sergeants' positions throughout the department. If the
commission will sign the UCP8 personnel action forms in their next meeting, the
sheriff will have changes and promotions by October 1,1991. (R823 Exhibit A, 1476
70)
On September 19,1991 shift supervisors were advised that the salary survey passed
and the commission should approve the UCP8 form personnel actions and send them out to
us. (R1476 75)
October 3, 1991 shift supervisor meeting minutes indicate,
Personnel has the list ready to go. They screened the applications for appropriate
qualifications, they took out some that should not have been omitted. They will do
the list again and send to the division commander, who will evaluate each person and
then start the interview process." (R830-829, 1476 80)
i

Special function, corrections and police officer certifications are all state POST certification
standards. (R1476 98) If a candidate for sergeant wasn't certified as a peace officer through
POST, they were required to successfully go through POST after being promoted. (R1476
29

99, 100)
UCP8fs are personnel action forms that go through the county commission, are signed
off by the sheriff and county commission, and audited and put in employee files. (R1476
102) Dixie Brunson, Lana Morris, and Bonnie Herkimer were POST certifiable when
promoted to jail sergeant (R1476 103) It is common practice throughout the department to
allow someone during a probationary period to achieve POST certifications. (R1476 123)
Owen Quarnberg, the jail commander in 1991, never made any commitments or
promises to all shift supervisors that they would be made sergeants. Deputies Martin and
Alexanderson never approached him wondering why they were not reclassified to sergeants
from shift supervisors. (R1476 131-132)
The JPPM primarily regulated the operation of the jail. (R1476 138) Sheriffs
Policies and Procedures took precedence over Jail Policies. (R1476 138-139) Utah County
Policies and Procedures took precedence over Sheriffs Office and Jail Policies and
Procedures. (R1476 139-140) JPPM § 150.02 applied only to the jail. (R1476 141-142)
Captain Quarnberg was not satisfied with the shift supervisor position. He felt that
sergeants selected in a department wide promotional process, who had the experience
required of people being promoted to sergeant would land real credibility to the deputies
working in the jail with law enforcement agencies, did not believe shift supervisors had been
particularly effective and desired to have a sergeant to hold accountable for making sure that
shifts were being done according to Sheriffs standards. (R1476 155-157)

Captain

Quarnberg did not feel that shift supervisor and sergeants' jail positions were the same and
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wanted to change the shift supervisor position by eliminating it, and do a sergeant's
promotional exam to put sergeants on the shift. (R1476 173-174)
In the August 225 1991 shift supervisor meeting, shift supervisors were directed to
submit a one page letter or memo to the sheriff indicating that they want to be considered for
a s^raeanfs position. (R1476 189-190)
The minimum requirements for a pre salary survey jail sergeant listed in the Office
of Personnel Management job description were four years experience as a deputy sheriff or
detective, POST certification, qualifying score on sergeant's examination. (R 914-915
Exhibit IB)
The post salary survey Sergeant Jail Operations Office of Personnel Management job
description required current POST certification, current CPR certification, BS degree
including thirty hours in psychology, sociology, interpersonal relations or closely related
field, three years job related work experience with demonstrated competence. (R 911-912
Exhibit 1C)
Sheriff Bateman's August 15, 1991 memo to all employees advised that shift
supervisor positions were to be eliminated and those filling the positions will automatically
be reclassified to corrections specialist. The memo also requested eligible employees to
submit a resume for each area where they desired consideration. It further advised that the
personnel department will determine eligibility on the basis of the resume and certify a
register from which the positions will be filled. (R 909 Exhibit 5)
C.

PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION WAS NOT A MINIMUM
QUALIFICATION FOR JAIL SERGEANT.
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The Deputies' claim that POST peace officer certification was a minimum
requirement for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 rests on JPPM § 127.03. It stated
"A.

General Classification: Deputy Sheriff
1.

Category One Police Status." (R 833, Exhibit G)

JPPM § 127.03, however is inconsistent with both the pre and post salary survey sergeants
job descriptions maintained by the Utah County Office of Personnel Management. The pre
salary survey job description required only "P.O.S.T. Certification". The post salary survey
sergeants job description required "current POST certification". Neither indicates peace
officer certification but only POST certification which maybe special functions, corrections
or peace officer/category I/law enforcement certifications. The last three terms, peace
officer/category I/law enforcement, are synonymous and have denoted statewide police
authority at various times in the past. Holding any one of the POST certifications,
corrections, special functions or peace officer, qualified a candidate for the POST
certification requirements contained in the pre and post salary survey Personnel job
descriptions.
The inconsistency in the Personnel job descriptions and the JPPM should be resolved
by the County Personnel Management Act, UCA 17-33-5, which provides in relevant part
(3) (a) (i) The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county....
(b) The rules shall provide for:. ..
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, that
all successful candidates shall be required to meet in order to be eligible for
consideration for appointment or promotion;...
County personnel rules determine minimum job requirements, not individual county
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departments. Even if JPPM § 127.03 stated minimum job requirements, it could not change
the requirements contained in Personnel jail sergeant job descriptions in Exhibits 1-B and 1C which required only POST certification. The Deputies have further failed to show that
Petitioner's personnel rules provided for the Sheriff to establish minimum requirements for
jail sergeant.
Also consistent with the fact that peace officer certification was not required for
consideration for jail sergeant is the Department's practice of allowing promoted sergeants
to obtain peace officer certification after promotion to sergeant. JPPM § 127.03 entitled
"JAIL SERGEANT (ON-LINE)" does not correspond with either the pre or post salary
survey personnel job descriptions which are for "Jail Sergeant" and "Sergeant/Jail
Operations". Nor was the designation of category I police status designated as a minimum
requirement in the JPPM. JPPM § 127.03 also omits education, experience and other
requirements found on the Personnel Office job descriptions. Does silence in the JPPM as
to other job requirements found in the Personnel job descriptions eliminate the other
requirements? In light of the County Personnel Management Act and the reasons stated
above, the Court should determine that any implied finding that peace officer certification
was required for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 was clearly erroneous.
D.

SHIFT SUPERVISOR EXPERIENCE WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR
PROMOTION TO JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991.

Based on the same reasoning that personnel job descriptions govern if the terms of the
JPPM are in conflict with Personnel job descriptions, the jail sergeant minimum qualification
found in JPPM §150.023.b, of one year as a shift supervisor experience is not applicable.
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Both Personnel sergeant job descriptions conflict with the JPPM shift supervisor
requirement. The Personnel pre salary survey requirement was 4 years experience as a
deputy sheriff The Personnel post salary survey and current job description is 3 years related
work experience. Neither job description requires any shift supervisor experience.
With the issuing of a new sergeant job description in 1991 which does not require shift
supervisor experience and the elimination of the shift supervisor position, the JPPM shift
supervisor requirement if ever binding was eliminated along with the position. The conflict
in the JPPM and Personnel job descriptions should be resolved by giving the personnel job
descriptions precedence. To put the foot on the other shoe, someone meeting all the
requirements of the Personnel job descriptions who was not a shift supervisor or peace
officer who wanted to test for jail sergeant would have been allowed to test as the Personnel
job descriptions took precedence.
Because the Personnel job descriptions take precedence over the JPPM, the shift
supervisor position was eliminated, and a new sergeant job description issued without a shift
supervisor requirement, any finding that shift supervisor experience was required for
promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 is clearly erroneous.
IV.

THE DEPUTIES FAILED TO FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE WITHIN THREE
MONTHS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND IT IS THEREFORE BARRED
Section VILE.l of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and

Regulations (OPMRR) states in relevant part:
Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . .
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council.
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The employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three
months from the date of the occurrence . . .
Filing the appeal with the personnel director within three months is a jurisdictional
requirement. In Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Ut. Ct. App 1997) the court held
that a 14 day time limit to appeal a planning commission decision was jurisdictional, stating
that the City Council was without jurisdiction to consider a landowners appeal filed after the
14 day time limit expired. Similarly, an employee having a grievance over merit principles
must file a written appeal to the CSC within three months from the date of the occurrence of
the grievance. Failure to do so is jurisdictional.
The three month time limitation within which an employee must file their appeal to
the CSC commences when the grievance occurs.
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to
run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple
ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations.
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575,578 (Utah App. 1996). In Doit Inc.
v. Touche. Ross and Company, 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court
stated applicable rules on when a cause of action accrues as follows:
Under Utah law5 a statute of limitations begins to run against a party when the cause
of action accrues. . . . As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff
could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion.... Once a
claim accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced within the limitations
prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [Citations omitted]
In the instant matter, the Deputies grievance occurred when the promotion decisions
for jail sergeant were made in December of 1991 and subsequent years. After the promotions
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occurred, the Deputies had three months within which to file a grievance with the CSC. The
Deputies failed to appeal promotion decisions within three months of the promotions, and
they cannot be permitted to pursue such claims more than five years after the 1991
promotions and outside of 3 months of any other promotions.
No promotion decision was made in the three months prior to January 10,1997, when
the Deputies filed their request for CSC review, and the Deputies' claims are therefore baited
by the 3 month limitation of actions.
V

IT WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO DETERMINE THAT THE
DEPUTIES DID NOT KNOW OF AND COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE
KNOWN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION WITHIN THE
LIMITATION PERIOD
Generally a cause of action accrues and the relevant statue of limitations begins to rim
4
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action... [and]
mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not prevent the running
of the statute of limitations'. However in certain instances the discovery rule allows
for the tolling of the statute of limitations'until the discovery of facts forming the
basis for the cause of action'.
This court has recognized three circumstances where the discovery rule
applies: (1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of
the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would
be irrational or unjust regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the
discovery of the cause of action.

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838P.2d 1125, 1128, 1129 (Utah 1992).
"If the discovery rule applies, the applicable statute of limitations is held to have
commenced running only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known the facts
giving rise to the cause of action". Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah App. 1996). In order to consider the discovery rule, "an initial showing must be
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made that the plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence
of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Warren v. Provo
Citv Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992); Sevev v. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d
629,634 (Utah 1995); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139,1144 (Utah
1991)
The limitation period is postponed only by the belated discovery of key facts and not
by delayed discovery of legal theories. To determine whether a plaintiff should have
discovered the facts forming the basis of a cause of action two concepts must be
considered, inquiry notice and reasonable diligence. Was the plaintiff on notice that
she might have a cause of action and if so was she reasonably diligent in investigating
the facts surrounding the loss.
As to inquiry notice,c the test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry...
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'.
Anderson, at 579.
To invoke the discovery rule, therefore, it is necessary for the Deputies to show that
within the limitation period they did not know and could not reasonably have known that they
were not promoted in 1991, and that the promoted deputies did not meet minimum job
qualifications.
Below, the Deputies advanced the following in support of a finding that they did not
know or should not have known of the cause of action before December, 1996. The
discovery in December of 1996 of illegal testing activities; Sheriff Bateman's December 30th
1996 pronouncement that shift supervisor was never a ranked position; that the Sheriff had
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acted on a false premise in every promotional testing process utilized by the Department
since the elimination of the shift supervisor rank; that shift supervisor was never a ranked
position; the Sheriff acknowledged for the first time in December 1996 that there had been
inconsistencies in the Department's promotional process; the Deputies were repeatedly
assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the
reclassification of their positions and the Sheriff assured them that he would make things
right; the Deputies were urged by the Department to resolve their issues internally, feeling
considerable institutional pressure for them to do so; unbeknownst to the Deputies until
December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely and were often
disregarded by Department management. (Court of Appeals Brief of Appellant, page 26,27)
These considerations are simply not relevant to when the Deputies discovered the key
facts-that the Deputies were not promoted in December 1991 and that deputies not meeting
minimum requirements were promoted to jail sergeant in December 1991.
Anything concerning the fairness of the testing process, procedural irregularities
or whether testing policies were followed is not relevant. A finding that the testing process
did not comply with policy would not result in the Deputies promotion to sergeant. Any such
finding would result in setting aside the promotion and conducting a new process meeting
required policies. This the Deputies did not request. They requested promotion. The alleged
testing irregularities are irrelevant as to whether the Deputies were the only qualified deputies
to be promoted to jail sergeant in 1991.
The discovery through Mr. Martin's conversation with Sergeant Morgan of alleged
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testing improprieties concerned a non ranked patrol position and is unrelated to the Deputies
or the 1991 promotions. The date of Mr. Martin's conversation with Sgt. Morgan is not in
the CSC record and should not be considered. The Deputies alleged the date of this
conversation for the first time when this matter was briefed in the District Court. Sheriff
Bateman's December 30, 1996 "admission" to the Deputies claimed "inconsistencies" in
promotion policy is also not relevant to whether the Deputies should have been promoted in
December 1991. SheriffBateman's December 30,1996 response was not in the record when
the CSC decided this matter and should not be considered. Sheriff Bateman's December 30,
1996 response was added to the record in June of 1998 over Utah County's due process
objection after this matter was remanded to the CSC for findings of fact and conclusions of
law which were never entered. (R 815, 816, 794, 768)
The following alleged circumstances are also equally irrelevant to the question of
who was promoted to jail sergeant in 1991. Discovering in the December 1996 letter that the
Sheriff did not consider Shift supervisor to be a department wide rank or that they had not
been given due credit for Shift supervisor experience in past promotional processes. The
Sheriff in the same letter advised that the Deputies had been given consideration for their
supervisory experience and would continue to do so. Whether promotion or eligibility
requirements fluctuated or were disregarded. The alleged concealment of promotion
registers. The registers have nothing to do with minimum qualifications. The Deputies knew
who was promoted and did not need the register to know who was. Alleged assurances that
the Deputies would be treated fairly and encouraging the Deputies to resolve their issues
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internally. The alleged institutional pressure or determination that it would be better for their
careers to not rock the boat. Encouraging the Deputies to apply for promotion. There simply
are no facts alleged that have any relevance to when the Deputies first discovered or should
have discovered they were not promoted, who was promoted, and whether the promoted
employees met the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant.
If the Court finds any of the above allegations relevant, the review of the record on
whether the Deputies made the required threshold showing before the CSC is problematical.
The discovery rule was raised by the Deputies for the first time in the District Court.
At the beginning of the April 23,1997 hearing after Utah County's Motion to Dismiss
was argued by the parties the CSC ruled
With regards to the issue of the timely filing of this particular grievance, the Council
rules that it is timely filed. We want that to be formally on the record, and we wanted
the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the filing was December
17, 1996, It was filed—it was a 90 day period to file, it was filed January 10 with
Marilyn (inaudible) Personnel Director, so that matter is no longer at issue." (R1476
33)
The CSC also ruled in the June 30, 1997 written decision
The Council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should
be barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with Sheriff
Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You
filed within ninety days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing.
The Deputies raise the discovery rule in an attempt for the Court to uphold the CSC's
decision on other grounds,, In light of the imprecise CSC findings, Utah County will attempt
to marshal the evidence in favor of a finding that the trigger date for the filing was December
17,1996 and the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should
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drive the time for filing.
Hie Deputies' arguments at the Pre-hearing and April 23, 1997 hearings are not
evidence and should not be considered by the court in determining whether the record
supports a finding that the Deputies reasonably first discovered their cause of action on
December 17, 1996, Neither should the court consider the Deputies December 17, 1996
outline and the Sheriff s December 30,1996 response thereto which were added to the record
over Petitioner's due process objections after the CSC decision while this matter was on
remand. Petitioner nevertheless has marshaled these arguments and evidence if the Court
finds them admissible.
A.

EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE DEPUTIES CLAIMS

Unless otherwise noted the following evidence/arguments were argued bv the
Deputies or their counsel, or are from the Deputies' testimony.
Pre-hearing argument-The Deputies relied in good faith on the Sheriffs promises
that this would be made good, they believed their Sheriff when he said he would make it
good on it and handle it internally. (R 754) The reason it was not filed in 1991 was that some
promise was given by the Sheriff that the matter would be taken care of, the last meeting they
had, the Sheriff said that when he said he would make good on it was in December of 1996,
the first time that he actually in writing responded and said he would not be doing anything
(R 752, 753) The case concerns the 1991 demotion and the ongoing testing process and
inconsistencies that have occurred over the years. The Sheriff didn't respond at that point
negatively to our case. (R 751) The Deputies in the two years prior to 1997 were told to bide
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their time that it would be made right. (R 751) In 1991 a salary survey was done. The
Deputies had to figure out for themselves that they were being disciplined and that took a
period of time. (R 744) The Deputies understood they had to go up their chain of command
and did not realize that they should go separately and file a formal grievance. (R 743) Their
understanding of the policy is that you go up the chain of command. They understood that
there's a process you do within before you go without. (R 743) The Deputies were unable
to determine whether the candidates had been certified as being eligible and in fact they were
not. When the register was subsequently formed, they were never given access to the
register. That was held in confidence by the Sheriff. It was never posted, nobody actually
knew where they were, where they placed on the register. When the Deputies filed this
grievance and requested documentation, the Sheriff did come forth and find the registers and
submit them to the Deputies. The Deputies were not able to gain access to the registers for
many years until the grievance was filed. (R 742, 743)
April 23.1997 h earing argument - Sheriff Bateman made promises to the Deputies
that he would make it right, we can handle this internally, I'll make it right and give
promises. (R 1476 14) The Deputies tried to be team players by believing the Sheriff when
he says heTl make it right. (R1476 15) The Deputies relied on his promises to make it right.
(R 1476 17) In December of 1996 the Sheriff indicated that if he could prove these
commitments had been made he would make the situation right. The Sheriff made the
commitment in his office that if he could find these commitments had been made that he
would make it right not only make it right in the sense of promote us to Sergeant (R 1476 22,
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23) In December of 1996 Sheriff Bateman represented to the Deputies that he would
investigate their allegations and if he was able to determine their allegations were accurate,
he would do what he could to make it right. (R1476 26) December 1996 was the first time
Sheriff Bateman put in writing you are getting no relief. They relied on promises made by
Captain Quamberg to them who was their superior. It's not quite right for the Sheriff to
come in here and wash his hands of the matter when the people below him and yet above
these Deputies make promises that they will be made right to appease them meanwhile the
clock is ticking. (R 1476 30) The Deputies trusted their Sheriff when he made promises
whether it was himself or through his subordinates who are their superiors that it would be
made right. (R 1476 31)
April 23.1997 hearing evidence - Sgt. Mike Morgan was supervising a number of
people in the jail division while a testing procedure was taking place for a lateral transfer
from other areas into patrol. An individual called him and asked him for input on questions
he was formulating for the test. The questions were given over the phone and Sgt. Morgan
wrote them down. After talking about the questions for some time and also about a specific
candidate that Sgt. Morgan was supervising at the jail, the candidate's qualifications and
whether he would make a good patrol deputy was discussed. At the end of the conversation,
the individual said, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on your desk and somebody
walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there, you couldn't be held
responsible for that." Sgt. Morgan responded, "Well, I'm not going to do that, and we went
on and talked about a couple of other things," After the conversation, Sgt. Morgan shredded
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the questions. Sometime later on an unspecified date, Sgt. Morgan related the experience to
Mr. Martin in an attempt to persuade him that the testing procedures in patrol that Sgt..
Morgan had been involved in were one hundred percent credible, very objective and not
subjective in trying to secure certain people. (R1476 193-196)
May 29.1997 hearing evidence - In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was
told there were no more shift supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes
were made.(R 1477 17) The Department failed to establish eligibility lists or appointment
registers and make them available to applicants. Exhibit O, the 1991 sergeant register, was
never made public and the Deputies did not obtain it until they requested it of the Sheriff.
Nobody had any idea where they had placed on an eligible register. They had only seen it
in connection with the grievance. (R1477 69) People have been promoted without there ever
being a register and positions were filled with a secret process. (R 1477 77) Over the two
years prior to 1997, sergeant testing was exclusive to the jail and a jail only sergeant's
position. In approximately 1995 Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it
was unfair that he had to basically test again to try to regain the ground that he already held.
Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, but didn't agree with it and also said,
Go ahead and bide your time. If you want to test for a position that comes available
in another part of the Department, when that position becomes available you'll be
afforded the opportunity to test." And I was willing to do that. I was willing to let
the water under the bridge, you know, be under the bridge. I bided my time, I spun
my wheels for another two years. There were only two processes that took place in
1995 and 1996 and again, those were exclusive to the jail. The one in 1995 I did
participate in, the two I think that occurred in 1996 I did not with the understanding
that when a position became available I would be able to test for it. (R 1477 78, 79)
Many of the registers are kept confidential. You can't get one unless you either
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request to see it and again if I didn't get the promotion, I don't even want to look at the
register, that's just me. In numerous promotional announcements they say that the registers
will not be made available. They will be held in confidence. (R1477 81) Mr. Alexanderson
responded, when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint "Because as
I stated I tried to be a loyal employee I thought the Sheriff was doing the right thing. (R1477
98-99)
Evidence improperly submitted after the CSC decision while case on remand- On
December 17, 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss long held concerns
contained in an outline (supra p. 6, 7) about promotions and possible corruption within the
Department and requested that the Sheriff investigate and provide the Deputies a remedy.
(R 791, 792) In Sheriff Bateman's response thereto he stated,
The issue of automatic advancement of shift supervisors is not warranted because the
position of shift supervisor was never a ranked position. It was rather a temporary
solution to supervision problems in limited areas of the Sheriffs Office, primarily the
jail. Shift supervisors were allowed to wear corporal stripes as a way of visually
recognizing their supervisory status, but was never intended as the creation of an
office wide ranked structure....
Deputy in charge and shift supervisor experience have been considered as part
of the evaluation process and will continue to be considered
I dofindevidence of your dissatisfaction with departmental promotional policy
that is consistent with issues raised under "inconsistencies" . . .
Inconsistencies have occurred, but only in an attempt to be as fair and impartial
as possible. Each time a promotional opportunity has been available, things have
been learned that I believe have allowed us to do a better job the next time. The new
process being put in place in 1997 will, I hope, establish a system that will eliminate
the past inconsistencies. (R340, 341)
B

CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT

The foregoing argument/evidence is deficient of any relevant facts supporting a claim
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that the Deputies did not know or could not have known of the key facts - that they were not
promoted in December 1991, that someone who did not meet minimum qualifications had
been and the Deputies believed they were the only applicants meeting minimum
qualifications. The Deputies knew or were on inquiry notice of the key facts. This is amply
demonstrated by the following evidence/argument. Unless otherwise noted, the following
argument/evidence is from the Deputies and their Counsel.
Pre-hearing argument- The job description that we were holding, shift supervisor,
was attributed as sergeant in the salary survey.(R 745,746) The Deputies were left as acting
sergeants from July of 1991 to December of 1991. (R 745) The Deputies brought up their
complaint about the whole process or lack of process time and time again, (R 752,753) The
grievance was made known to the Sheriff in 1991 by Mr. Martin.(R 751) Mr. Martin spoke
with the Sheriff on several occasions personally and wrote him a long letter in April of 1992
after it became clear what was going on. The reclassification of deputies was done in
violation of some policies and we couldn't understand why they were violating the policies.
Two of the shift supervisors that we served with were moved up to sergeants rank. Mr.
Alexanderson moved out to Patrol when it was made clear to him that he was not going to
be moved up to avoid the chagrin of having to go back on a shift. Mr. Martin went back on
a shift and had to train his new sergeant. They brought in someone that was unqualified in
violation of some policies that we can show. (R 745,746) In and around December of 1991
there were complaints that are documented. Mr. Martin did not file a formal complaint at
that time as he felt that the situation was going to right itself as soon as the promotions
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started to become consistent and/or recognized that we were the qualified competent people
logical for the next sergeants positions, when in fact they started opening up and changing
the career ladder and doing some alterations that affected that whole situation and that's
when it started to become clear, and that's when in about April of 1992 which was four
months from the promotions. (R 743,744) The Sheriff was the only one that could answer
certain questions and he was on notice from the get go that they had a complaint about the
process. (R743)
April23.1997hearing argument- Mr. Martin was told he's not allowed to wear his
second stripe in December of 1991 the first he knew that he had been demoted.(R1476 15)
In December 1996 was when the Sheriff beyond the letter dated 1992 put something in
writing saying basically I'm doing nothing for you. (R1476 16) The Deputies were advised
the job they were doing is equivalent to that of a sergeant however we are going to eliminate
the shift supervisor position and make sergeants in those positions instead of taking the shift
supervisors competently doing the job. They said okay we're going to open it up to eligible
corrections specialists with other kinds of criteria with different backgrounds. They
expanded the criteria for eligibility to get the shift sergeant position which was replacing the
shift supervisor position. We at the time didn't think that was fair, however it was not
portrayed to us as a disciplinary action. We said okay, we're going to reclassify everybody
and we're going to promote from the greater pool including some correction specialists. I
had real trouble with that at the time because here I was supervising and training and
evaluating and managing the jail and watching over personnel and now I had to compete
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against those personnel to get basically my old job back which was a shift supervisor now
shift sergeant position, (R 1476 18, 19) Mr. Martin made his dissatisfactions vocal to
Captain Quarnberg, the Bureau Chief, and Sheriff Bateman and wrote Sheriff Bateman the
1992 letter. (R 1476 19) Mr. Martin was moved back onto a shift "Just take your rank
you're being absorbed back onto a shift" and at that time I thought that it was wrong because
here I had been doing the supervisory job for 4 Vi years, there's no discemable difference in
the job description change, yet they are taking me out of the position absent disciplinary
action or any kind of rationale I could see. (R 1476 20) At the time Mr. Martin was
disgruntled. He was on a team and went along with it because he believed that because the
policy said that you needed a year as a shift supervisor to be promoted, any further
promotions that came down the pipe were going to be a shoe in because I was one of the only
few people who had shift supervisor experience. (R 1476 21, 22) Numerous statements
were made in shift supervisor meeting where there would be automatic advancement of the
current shift supervisors into the position of sergeant. (R1476 22) When promises were made
in shift supervisor meeting the Deputies were under the understanding quite rightfully that
they were the only qualified individuals so that they were going to be the two made sergeant
and they were not. (R 1476 28)
April23.1997hearing evidence-By letter dated April 22,1992 Mr. Martin raised the
following issues with Sheriff Bateman. Mr. Martin was troubled by his unreasonable
placement on the promotion list; the most recent promotional process was a popularity
contest based on perceptions about individual personalities and promotability instead of an
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objective analyzation of day to day task accomplishments and true ability; the salary survey
showed that shift supervisors in the jail were doing a job comparable to sergeants in other
divisions and indeed attributed the sergeant rank to the shift supervisor job description with
no significant alteration; all active shift supervisors should have been promoted to the new
rank automatically unless there was specific cause to revoke supervisory status; shift
supervisor corporals who were not promoted were effectively demoted. (R 907) Mr. Martin
realized he actually had been demoted, lost rank, supervisory authority and apparently all
recognition received as a shift supervisor; in December of 1991 Captain Quarnberg told him
he placed second to the bottom on the final roster. He attempted to justify Mr. Martin's low
placement by saying that he was a worker not a leader. (R 906) He takes issue with the
promotion into a position over me of any line deputy he supervised and evaluated; his
experience as a shift supervisor (as established in Jail Policy and Procedure 150.02)
designates him as a more logical and qualified choice for the position of jail sergeant than
any line deputy without shift supervisor experience, irregardless of the recent promotional
assessment; his supervisory experience cannot be forgotten or trivialized and his promotion
to corporal was never rescinded and must be given due consideration in any promotional
process. (R 905) Mr. Martin could only surmise that he had been attacked behind his back
by someone or some group with enough administrative clout to influence the promotions
rather than strictly evaluating performances measured against standardized guidelines;
perhaps his style of leadership, his feelings about politics, his religious beliefs, or any of the
million other subjective perceptions became part of the criteria for evaluating him; the
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Sheriffs Department constantly changing promotional process was transformational and
whimsical not predictable and calculable; the promotional criteria and procedure are changed
so much and so often creating disparity from one promotion to the next; promotional ground
rules constantly change; the Sheriffs Department needs standardization, objective
promoting, and to follow written policies. (R 904) He lost earned rank, recognition,
authority and wage difference between deputy and sergeant. (R 903)
By letter dated April 22,1992 Sheriff Bateman replied to Mr. Martin's letter. Sheriff
Bateman responded that he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate.
Two promotion cycles ago he was approached in writing by all individuals eligible for
promotion at the time and under the auspices of the Deputies Association to eliminate the
objective and competitive process the Sheriffs Department was using. It was too stressful
and the applicants would rather the Sheriff just make the selections for the open positions.
Sheriff Bateman stated that the majority of those being considered for promotion have been
satisfied with the new selection process and absent feedback to the contrary he would
continue to honor the request to not use the more objective and competitive process used in
the past. Sheriff Bateman invited Mr. Martin to work through the Deputies Association to
bring about a change if sentiments have changed. (R 908).
May 29K1997 hearing evidence- In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was
told there were no more shift supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes
were made. (R 1477 17) At the end of December they came in with new job descriptions,
now you can stop wearing your two stripes and promoted Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and
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the Deputies were absorbed back onto the shifts. (R 1477 18) Mr. Alexanderson saw this
coming when they started talking about just promoting two sergeants and made arrangements
to go to Patrol. Mr. Martin went back on a shift and trained his new sergeant. Mr. Martin
was told off and on for months leading up to the point where they actually said there are no
shift supervisors. (R 1477 18) There is no discemable difference between the functions of
shift supervisors that they're performing and the sergeants. (R 1477 19) It was Mr.
Alexanderson9 s understanding when the news first came that shift supervisor was going to
be eliminated that those who were serving in that capacity would be promoted to sergeant
based on inseemingly assurances throughout the years that they had talked about upgrading
that position to sergeant (R 1477 19-20) Dennis Howard, a patrol deputy, was promoted
and became Mr. Martin's sergeant. (R 1477 21) According to the policies at the time and
the job descriptions we felt that we were qualified if not more qualified than Mark Binks and
Herkimer in as much that we were peace officer certified. We were confused because there
was no testing. (R 1477 21-22) Mr. Martin understood the minimum qualifications of the
jail sergeant at that time were shift supervisor for one year, peace officer certified and a
college degree. (R 1477 22) He came to that understanding through a job description
outlined in the Sheriffs Department Policy and Procedure Manual (Exhibit G, R 833)
requiring peace officer certification and minimum hiring requirements of the jail. Exhibit
G, the 1991 JPPM jail sergeant job description at the time that Herkimer and Binks were
promoted as jail sergeants, was available to all deputies that were interested in being
promoted to sergeant. (R 1477 22, 23) Mr. Martin understood Bonnie Herkimer was not
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POST certified at the time of her promotion as he remembers her having to go to POST after
that to go up and get her certification. (R 1477 30) Mr. Howard at the time of promotion
was not a shift supervisor for a year. (R 1477 30) Mr. Martin learned Binks and Herkimer
were promoted when he saw them wearing sergeant's rank around the time he was told
vaguely in the control room he didn't need to wear his rank anymore. (R 1477 32) Mr.
Howard when promoted had not served as a shift supervisor and was trained by Mr. Martin.
(R1477 33-34) In December Captain Quamberg told Mr. Martin I view you as a worker not
a leader so you're not getting promoted to the sergeant position. (R 1477 34) In April or
May of 1992 Mr. Martin transferred out of the jail. He was humiliated and wanted to get out
of the situation. (R 1477 35) When the shift supervisor position was eliminated Mr. Martin
complained to his supervisors that what about the policy that requires one year of shift
supervisor experience which had not been rescinded. At the time he went to his sergeant.
He said how can they do this. They are eliminating our ranked position. They're going to put
sergeant's in the exact same position. (R 1477 52-53) Mr. Martin has always had access
to the Jail Manual and the Sheriffs Office Manual and the Personnel Manual. (R 1477 54)
Mr. Alexanderson testified in December of 1991 he was called into Captain
Quamberg's office and told the promotion list is coming out tomorrow and you're not on it.
Prior to the time he met with Captain Quamberg he expected to receive a sergeant job based
on numerous assurances, commitments in shift supervisor meetings. (R 1477 58) They all
expected to become sergeants after the salary survey. The job description was rewritten. The
job description remained the same only the title changed. (R 1477 60) Bonnie Herkimer and
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Mark Binks were not certified peace officers when promoted to sergeant which he
understood to be a minimum qualification. (R 1477 61-63) The Deputies submitted their
letter and their resumes and basically thought "this is it the stripes are coming — or the
additional stripe is coming. We've met all the requirements, we've got all the qualifications
this is just something that is some sort of a requirement." (R 1477 64) The Deputies were
advised in the September 6, 1991 shift supervisor meeting that shift supervisors had been
eliminated, that everyone would remain where they were for the time being. (R 1477 70,
109- 111) Dennis Howard, when promoted to sergeant in 1991, had correctional experience,
did not have a college degree and had never been a shift supervisor. (R 1477 72) The same
night Mr. Alexanderson was told he was not going to be on the promotional list he was
offered a patrol spot and snapped it up because he was embarrassed, humiliated, had been
promoted, had his rank revoked, reneged, negated without reason whatsoever and opted to
save a little bit of face when they offered the opportunity and he got out of there and went
to patrol. (R 1477 75-76) Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for sergeant openings in the two
years prior to 1997 because over the last two years testing for the jail position of sergeant was
exclusive to the jail. The person being promoted to the rank of sergeant when the test was
being administered by the jail was in all likelihood going to remain in the jail for the rest of
his career. In a conversation in the two years prior to filing the grievance Mr. Alexanderson
informed the Sheriff that he thought it was unfair that he had to test again to try to regain the
ground he already held. Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, he necessarily
didn't agree with it but he understood it (p. 44, supra; R 1477 78-79)
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When Mr.

Alexanderson was told he was not going to be promoted he was floored, tears came to his
eyes, he said thank you got up and left. Since that time he's not been given explanations for
not being promoted. Many of the registers were kept confidential or you can t get one unless
you either request to see it5 and again if he didn't get the promotion he didn't even want to
look at the register. (R 1477 80-81)
When the Deputies requested that Sheriff Bateman forgo formal testing in 1994 Mr.
Alexanderson refused to sign the petition saying the testing should be waived. He didn't
think it was appropriate and instead of asserting his rights at that time he let it go. Mr.
Alexanderson responded when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint
I had conversations with the Sheriff indicating my displeasure at having to test to
regain the ground I had held in the Jail and I was willing to let bygones be bygones,
even to let my demotion go in order to be eligible to test when the position became
available in an area I was interested in up to 1996 and that's what the plan was. (R
1477 98-99)
Mr. Binks was in the police academy in 1991 and was told that he had made sergeant a
couple days before his actual graduation from the police academy. (R 1477 185)
C. THE DEPUTIES KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THEIR CAUSE
OF ACTION WHEN THEY WERE NOT PROMOTED IN DECEMBER
1991
Based on the foregoing facts any finding that the Deputies first knew or should have
known of their cause of action when they met with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 is
clearly erroneous. By their own statements the Deputies were on notice of and felt that they
were clearly wronged by their reclassification to corrections specialist from shift supervisor
and failure to be promoted to sergeant in 1991. When they learned they were not promoted
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in December of 1991, they believed they were the only qualified applicants for j ail sergeant.
The Deputies participated in the promotion process and knew who was promoted. They had
access to all relevant Personnel, Sheriff s Department and Jail rules, regulations, policies and
procedures.
The Deputies were on inquiry notice as early as August 15, 1991 when Sheriff
Bateman, by memo notified all employees that all shift supervisors were to be eliminated,
that those filling shift supervisor positions would automatically be reclassified to deputy
sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated pay loss and that sergeants'
positions would need to be filled if the salary survey is implemented, would be open to all
eligible employees and any eligible employee would be required to submit a resume to be
considered. (R909, Exhibit 5). Shift supervisors were notified on August 22,1991 in a shift
supervisor meeting that the salary survey was placed on hold and it could not be adopted until
the County Commission approved it, but that the salary survey would most likely go into
effect the first of October or first of the year and that promotions would be held up because
of the salary survey, but that the Department would go ahead with promotion applications.
(R 861, Exhibit P). Captain Quarnberg advised all shift supervisors in a shift supervisor
meeting of September 6,1991 that there were now no shift supervisors. (R823, Exhibit A).
Notice was given in the September 19,1991 shift supervisors' meeting that the salary survey
was approved by the Commission. (R825, Exhibit C). Notice was given in the October 3,
1991 shift supervisor meeting that Personnel had the list ready to go regarding promotions
and that the list would be sent out to evaluate each person and start the interview process.
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(R829, Exhibit D).
The Deputies were on actual notice of the facts forming the basis of their cause of
action in December 199L At the very least the Deputies were informed of circumstances
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry and did nothing for 5 years. There has been
no showing why the Deputies could not have discovered much sooner what they claimed to
discover from their meeting with Sheriff Bateman in 1996.
The Deputies claim that they did not learn of their grievance until their December
1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman is unsupported. Even if the court considers the
Deputies' December 17, 1996 outline presented to Sheriff Bateman in their meeting of the
same date which was made a part of the record over Petitioner's due process objection after
the CSC decided this matter, the outline (p. 6,7, supra) raised most, if not all of the issues
raised by the Deputies in this matter before they met with Sheriff Bateman.
As evidenced by the December 1996 outline and Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter,
before the Deputies ever went to talk to Sheriff Bateman, they were on inquiry or actual
notice asserting most if not all of the claims brought in the instant matter. However the
claimed discoveries, Sheriff Bateman's "admissions" to "inconsistencies"on December 30th,
1996, and the alleged discovery of testing irregularities, are not re levant or key facts shedding
light on who was promoted in 1991 and their minimum qualifications. The Deputies
complained about testing procedures far before December of 1996 as evidenced by the
complaints regarding testing procedures in Mr.-Martin's April 22, 1992 letter and Mr.
Alexanderson's refusal to sign a waiver of testing procedures in 1994. They were put on
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inquiry notice long before their meeting with the Sheriff in December of 1996.
The Deputies discovered nothing in their discussion with Sheriff Bateman in
December of 1996 which they could not have previously discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence had they pursued their claims after the 1991 and subsequent promotional
processes. There is nothing in the record to show what key facts the Deputies learned in or
after their meeting with Sheriff Bateman, and why whatever is alleged to have been learned
in or after the meeting with Sheriff Bateman should not have been discovered long ago
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'.
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996)
Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Deputies could have and should
have investigated whether they were correctly reclassified to corrections specialists when the
shift supervisor position was eliminated, whether appropriate procedures were followed in
the 1991 and subsequent sergeants promotions and whether individuals promoted to sergeant
in the jail or elsewhere possessed necessary minimum qualifications. The Deputies knew
who was promoted and participated in the processes. The Deputies could have made a
request under the Government Records Access Management Act for any documents
including eligibility and promotion registers they felt were necessary to their investigation.
Registers were not concealed as the Deputies did not request them. There is no evidence that
they requested registers and were turned down. They could have obtained copies of the
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revised job descriptions containing minimum job qualifications. There is no claim that the
County concealed any of these facts from the Deputies. Everything necessary to pursue their
claims was known or easily available to the Deputies in December 1991. Mr. Martin, in his
April 1992 letter to Sheriff Bateman, refers to JPPM § 150, the very section the Deputies
claim was violated in 1991 and subsequent promotions. (R905, Exhibit 2). Yet no claim was
filed for more than 5 years. Certainly an impermissible time period given the three month
limitation of actions.
The Deputies as early as August of 1991 but no later than December 1991 were on
inquiry notice. Had they investigated the matter then as they did in 1996, they could then
have decided to bring a claim within the limitations period at a time when the memories of
the personnel director, Sheriff, and Sheriffs personnel involved in the promotion process
were fresh, prior to the loss of registers and documents used in the promotional process, prior
to memories fading, evidence being lost, and witnesses being unavailable. (R 1476, 145,
146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174)
Because the Deputies knew of and should reasonably have known of the existence of
the grievance when they were not promoted, or on or before Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter,
or two years prior to bringing the cause of action when Mr. Alexanderson approached the
Sheriff regarding jail sergeant promotions, the discovery rule is not applicable to extend the
limitation of actions from commencing in December of 1991. The same is true for all alleged
deficiencies in promotional processes or qualifications of candidates promoted. Instead oi
pursuing their claims the Deputies chose to do nothing. They felt it better to not rock the
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boat than to assert their claimed rights and having made that decision, cannot now change
their mind and attempt to revive long expired claims. Given the duty of inquiry, the Deputies
did not with reasonable diligence pursue their grievance.
The Deputies failed to make the initial showing that they did not know of and could
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim
within the three month limitation period. Having failed to make this initial showing, the
Court should not consider whether the discovery rule is applicable.
VI

THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY
RULE IS NOT SATISFIED.
If the Court determines the Deputies did not know or should not have known of their

cause of action until December 1996, the discovery rule applies "where the Defendant
concealed the facts or misled the claimant, and as a result, the claimant did not become aware
of the cause of action until after the limitation period had run." Warren v. Provo City Corp..
838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)
. . . The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. As is
true in all cases of equitable estoppel for the doctrine to be invoked, a showing must
be made that under the circumstances the party claiming estoppel has acted in a
reasonable manner. Therefore in order to invoke the concealment version of the
discovery rule, it must be shown that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period. Warren v. Provo
City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992).
For the concealment prong of the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must "make a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier".
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Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578, 579(Utah App. 1996)
From the facts previously discussed there is no claim that the Sheriff Department
fraudulently concealed any key facts about minimum job qualifications, when and who was
promoted or what their qualifications were. The Deputies were on inquiry notice and had
access to all relevant rules, regulations, policies and procedures. The Deputies simply cannot
make the required primae facie showing of fraudulent concealment of key facts. For the
discovery rule to apply the Court must find that the Deputies did not become aware of key
facts because of the Sheriffs concealment or misleading conduct occurring before the
limitation period ran. The Deputies do not allege that any concealment or misleading
conduct prevented them from becoming aware of who was promoted or whether they held
the minimum qualifications for the job.
Defendant's allege that they were not given access to eligibility or promotional
registers. A review of promotional registers or eligibility lists is not relevant as they would
not have been helpful to determine who was promoted, what the minimum qualifications
were for promotion and whether the promoted individual met minimum qualifications. There
is no evidence that the Deputies pursued the procedures and remedies available under
GRAMA to obtain copies of promotion or eligibility registers or that they even requested
registers. The Deputies had access to job descriptions, the JPPM, and the OPMRR, and
could have ascertained with reasonable diligence job minimum qualifications and whether
the promoted sergeants met those qualifications.
The Deputies claim their inaction to be a result of assurances of department
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management that they would be "treated fairly" and "things made right". The Deputies
cannot reasonably rely on the alleged assurances of Department management, (see argument
of Mr. Alexanderson at R 1476 22 alleging assurances made in shift supervisor meetings in
1991) made before the limitation of actions commenced when the 1991 promotions were
made. Sheriff Bateman had the final say in recommending who would be promoted. Nor
are any such statements identified as occurring within the limitations period.

Mr.

Alexanderson argued at the April 1997 Pre-hearing and later testified that Sheriff Bateman
told him to bide his time and things would be made right in the two previous years. This
alleged statement did not occur within any limitations period and cannot form the basis for
a finding of fraudulent concealment, or misleading conduct.
The alleged repeated assurances that they would be treated fairly as a result of the
reclassification and that the Sheriff personally assured them he would make things right
concerned complaints the Deputies were already making and aware of. The allegations of
being treated fairly and make things right are also vague. Were these allegations made in the
context of promotions of the Deputies to sergeant or the procedures of future promotions?
While the Deputies make vague allegations of repeated assurances of being treated fairly and
that the Sheriff would make things right, the evidence cannot place any such assurances
within a limitation period following a sergeant promotion.
After the Deputies were not promoted in 1991 the record contains only three
communications between the Deputies and anyone in Sheriff Department management. The
first was April 2251992 when the Sheriff responded to Mr. Martin's letter of the same date.
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Therein (Exhibit 3, R 908) the Sheriff told Mr. Martin he was not convinced that Mr.
Martin's perceptions were accurate. There were no promises of promotions, that things
would be made right, or favorable treatment in the correspondence. Exhibit 3 is a complete
denial of Mr. Martin's April 22, 1992 letter. The next conversation is detailed by Mr.
Alexanderson. Around the 1995 sergeants promotions he had a conversation with the Sheriff
wherein the Sheriff expressed that he did not agree with Mr. Alexanderson's representation
that he was having to retest to regain ground he already held. The Sheriff said he understood
his position but did not agree with it and advised "Bide your time and when an opportunity
becomes available to test in another area of the Department you'll be allowed to test." This
was no promise of promotion or that things would be made right. The third conversation
occurred on December 17, 1996. The Sheriff indicated he would investigate the Deputies
claims and if he believed they were meritorious he would do what he could to make it right.
However this conversation occurred far too long after 1991 or any promotion to have any
effect on a limitation of actions. The Deputies' claims of relying on repeated assurances of
favorable treatment are not reasonable in light of the foregoing conversations. In fact to do
so would violate merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants for a promotion.
UCA 17-33-5(3)(b)(xi). None of the conversations or alleged repeated false assurances can
be established to have occurred within any specific limitation period, nor had the effect of
concealing key facts or misleading the Deputies.
The Deputies claimed "institutional pressure" to resolve issues internally or their
determination that they were unlikely to find promotional success if they were perceived
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unwilling to work within the system does not amount to concealing or misleading conduct
preventing them from discovering key facts. Nor does urging the Deputies to apply for
promotions. Nor does a promise to treat them fairly or a promise of promotion. Nor does
the alleged fluctuation of promotion and eligibility requirements.
Reliance on concealment of promotion irregularities is unjustified. The Defendant's
participated in and were familiar with promotion processes or whether a promotional process
occurred and knew who was promoted.
The Deputies allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's
statements (R 1477 at 26), where he says that he never said that he would automatically
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476 132). Also
showing any reliance on alleged representations to be unreasonable is Mr. Alexanderson's
conversation with Sheriff Bateman in 1995.(R 1477 78, 79, supra p.42, 43)

Besides

occurring long after and outside of any limitations period, the Sheriffs statements are not a
promise to promote, to make things right or an attempt to keep the Deputies from filing their
grievance.
The record does not contain facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of
fraudulent concealment or misleading conduct which prevented the Deputies from being
aware of key facts. There is nothing in the record to show that the County concealed facts
or engaged in misleading conduct to prevent the Plaintiffs from discovering key facts or lull
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the Deputies into sleeping on their rights. The Deputies5 failure to investigate is the only
reason for any claimed failure to discover.
No statements were made within limitations periods upon which the Deputies relied
in not timely bringing this matter before the Council. Even if such statements were made,
reliance thereon was not reasonable in light of Sheriff Bateman's April 22,1992 letter to Mr.
Martin and his conversation with Mr. Alexanderson concerning the 1995 promotions.
VII

THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY
RULE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
A prerequisite to the application of the discovery rule is ignorance by the plaintiff of
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. To invoke the exceptional circumstances
version of the discovery rule, the claimants must make a threshold showing that they
did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of
action. In fact, the requirement would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on
any version of the discovery rule judicial or legislative.

O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). As discussed
above, the Deputies were on notice of their cause of action when they were not promoted in
1991 and cannot make the threshold showing that they did not know and could not
reasonably have known of the existence of the facts giving rise to a cause of action. The
court, therefore, should not proceed further to examine whether the exceptional
circumstances prong of the discovery rule applies. If the Court determines otherwise, the
exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not apply for the following
reasons.
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is applicable
. . . in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showin g
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that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action."
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996)
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational
or unjust is a balancing test . . . The balancing test weighs the hardship
imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations against
any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time
Some
factors this court considers in applying this test include whether the
defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are greater than the
plaintiffs, whether the defendant performed a technical service that the
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the
claim has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot
be found, and the parties cannot remember basic events.
Sevev vs. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 629,636 (Utah 1995). The alleged hardship on
the Deputies from applying the limitation of actions would be not promoting the Deputies
and the extra pay associated with a promotion. This hardship is somewhat minimized by the
fact that the Deputies did not participate in the 1997 and subsequent sergeant's promotional
process and Mr. Alexanderson did not test in 1996. The prejudice to Utah County resulting
from the passage of time is significant however. The Utah County personnel directors from
1991 through 1996 no longer work at the County. One has moved to Arizona, the other
retired. Documents reflecting job announcements, promotional registers, promotional tests
and or processes no longer existed or could not be found. The County introduced into
evidence all documents found relating to Sheriffs Department sergeants' promotions.
Documents which could have helped reconstruct the prior promotional processes and
especially the 1991 promotional process could not be found. Further, Sheriff Bateman could
not recall the 1991 promotional process, and neither could Lieutenant John Carlson nor
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Captain Owen Quarnberg. (R 1476, 145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174)
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule has applied in only two (2)
cases since 1981. In Sevey, Security Title Company failed to perfect a security interest in
water shares and the water shares were lost. Sevey. at 636. The second case, Clinger v.
Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) involved a surveyor who had negligently surveyed
property. The buyers in that case had no reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate.
The technical aspects of surveys and perfecting security interests are not present in this case.
Utah County did not perform a technical service that the Deputies could not have reasonably
been expected to evaluate.
Because this case does not involve a technical service and the prejudice to Utah
County resulting from the passage of time outweighs the alleged hardship imposed on the
Deputies by the application of the limitation of actions, the exceptional circumstances prong
does not apply to extend the limitation of actions in this instance.
VIIL NEITHER ESTOPPEL NOR THE DISCOVERY RULE CAN BE RELIED ON
BY THE DEPUTIES
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equilable
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. Warren
v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992).
Under the Court's traditional analysis, to estop a party from claiming the limitation
of actions as a defense, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's action caused plaintiffs
failure to bring a timely suit. The elements of estoppel are
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken
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on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; (3) injury
to the plaintiff that would result from allowing the defendant to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. S & G. Inc. v.
Intermountain Power Agency 913 P.2d 735, 741, 742 (Utah 1996).
Any such claim of the discovery rule or estoppel fails because "Utah recognizes the
general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Weese v.
Davis County, 834 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992).
Any claim that Utah County is estopped from asserting the limitation of actions
defense also fails for the reason that the Deputies cannot point to any statement made within
the applicable limitations period for the 1991 or subsequent promotional processes upon
which the Deputies could reasonably rely in not pursuing their claims within any given three
month limitation period. Even if all arguments and evidence relevant to the limitation of
actions issue are considered, those arguments are insufficient to establish estoppel or support
the application of the discovery rule.
At the Pre-hearing opposing counsel alleged that the Deputies were made promises
that this would be made good, that it would be made good and handled internally, there were
repeated complaints to the Sheriff from the Deputies, that the Sheriff said he would make
good on it in 1996, and that the first time the Sheriff said he would do nothing was in
December of 1996. Counsel further represented that they were told to bide their time and it
would be made right, that they were given notice that further testing would be suspended
until this matter was settled. (R752-754) Argument at the April 23, 1997 hearing alleged
promises that the Sheriff would make it right, it would be handled internally, and that they
relied on promises made by Captain Quarnberg and people below the Sheriff that it will be
67

made right (R 1476 14, 16, 17, 30),
Even assuming for the point of argument that these representations are true, the
Deputies can point to no statements made in the three months following the 1991 promotions
or three months following any promotions in which the Deputies were told that this matter
would "be made right or handled internally". The statements that this would be "made good
or made right" are vague promises upon which reliance would not be reasonable. As Sheriff
Bateman made final promotion recommendations, his statements only could be reasonably
relied on.
The representation that they were given notice that there would be no further
sergeant's testing until the matter was settled was in reference to the 1997 sergeant's
promotions from which the Deputies withdrew. The time frame of these alleged statements
is limited by other statements. At the Pre-hearing, Counsel alleges the Sheriff said he would
make good on it in 1996. (R754) At the Pre-hearing Mr. Alexanderson, said "Promises were
made by the Sheriff numerous times over the last two years." (R751) The arguments of the
Deputies are simply too vague to place a promise of the Sheriff within a specific three month
time period after a hiring decision was made. The alleged promises to make it right or not
promote until the Deputies issue was settled were not made until 1995 and 1996, even
according to their allegations. This is far too long after the 1991 promotional process to have
any effect in estopping the County from asserting the limitation of actions contained in the
PRR. Any reliance thereon would be unreasonable in light of the time period which passed
between the promotional processes and the filing of the grievance in 1997 and also in light
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of the Sheriff Bateman's response to Mr. Martin's 1992 letter. (R 903-908, Exhibits 2, 3).
The Deputies5 allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's
statements (R 14769 26) where he says that he never said that he would automatically
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476, 132). Also,
showing reliance on any alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr.
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in early 1995 (R 1476 78, 79), where the Sheriff said he
understood Mr. Alexanderson's position, but didn't necessarily agree with it. There was no
promise to promote or make things right. In fact to just promote the Deputies would violate
merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants.
IX

IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THE DEPUTIES'
GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE
FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE MERITS
Petitioner presented several other meritorious arguments to the District Court in this

matter including the Deputies meeting with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was not an
occurrence with in the meaning of the 3 month limitation of actions; the JPPM did not
constitute an implied contract; the disclaimer in the JPPM prevented it from becoming an
implied contract; shift supervisor experience and peace officer certification were not jail
sergeant minimum qualifications; competitive testing was not required; the shift supervisor
position was not equivalent with the sergeant position; the Deputies failed to prove their case
by substantial legally competent evidence in the record, the award of back pay and promotion
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were inconsistent with the CSC's finding that the Deputies never were sergeant, the CSC
lacked jurisdiction; the CSC's recommendation was not binding; that the remedy was not
appropriate; the Renn standard of review did not apply; the CSC is not entitled to deference;
opposed the application of the discovery rule on estoppel and on the merits; compliance with
merit principles, state laws, and personnel rules and regulations; that the JPPM should be
interpreted in light of the elimination of the shift supervisor position and revised sergeant job
descriptions; failure to mitigate damages; and prospective relief. (R 259-288,410-479)
The district court Memorandum Decision deciding this case held the gross and
flagrant abuse of discretion standard inapplicable and accorded the CSC broad deference in
its findings of fact, reviewing the CSC's conclusions of law for correctness. (R 1460) Prior
to dismissing the case on limitation of actions grounds, the Court unnecessarily addressed
merit principles, finding the County's testing procedures arbitrary and violative of merit
principles. The District Court found "sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that
the testing procedures were at best inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria
to the point of being arbitrary and violative of merit principles ."(emphasis added) (R1459).
"Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on
merit principles. Therefore the findings of the Council on this issue will not be over
turned."(emphasis added) (R1457). The final order entered by the court, which the Deputies
did not object to, states that the CSC decision is reversed and the Deputies' claims dismissed
for failure to timely file their grievances. (R1461,1462) The Deputies appealed the District
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Court's Order Granting Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (R 1473)
Because this case was decided on the limitation of actions there was no need for the
district court to reach the merits and address the issue of merit principles. The court's
discussion of merit principles is dicta, should not have been reached and unnecessary to the
decision of this matter. The only issue before the Court of Appeals was the limitation of
actions determination, and this matter should have been remanded for a decision on the
merits to the district court.
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818P.2d23(Utah App. 1991) the appellant's
termination from Salt Lake County was upheld by a CSC and the district court. The
appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which noted that it would consider the
administrative proceeding as if the appeal were a direct appeal, giving no deference to the
district court's review since the Court of Appeals is just as capable of a review on the record
as the district court. IcL 26. Unlike the instant matter, the Tolman appeal involved denial
of the entire appeal, not granting of an appeal on limitation of actions grounds as in this case.
The guidance from Tolman was the deference afforded the district court, not what was before
it on appeal. Clearly the only issue before the Court of Appeals in this case was the
limitation of actions. The order appealed from did not address the merits, nor did the issues
stated in the Deputies' docketing statement and briefs below. The fact that no deference is
given to the district court by the appellate court does not change the rules regarding what was
before the court on appeal. If the Deputies had desired, they could have objected to the
district court order and requested the merit principles dicta included in the order. However,
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no such objection to the order was made. In any event the dicta only addressed testing
procedures, which would have only entitled the Deputies to set promotions aside, not to
promotion and back pay. Nowhere does the Memorandum Decision say the Deputies were
entitled to promotion and back pay.
There was nothing to cross appeal in the district court order. The merit principles
discussion was unnecessary to the decision, not determinative of the case and failed to
address the Petitioner' s other significant issues raised below. The merit principles discussion
did not address the key issue of what the minimum qualifications were, which has not been
decided by any court to date. While the Court of Appeals gave no deference to the district
court ruling and was in as good a position to review the case as the District Court, it does not
follow that it should review the merits when the merits were not reached by the District
Court. Requiring Petitioner to appeal dicta contained in a Memorandum Decision would
require appellate courts to review issues not decided by lower courts and disfavors judicial
economy.
By failing to remand this case for further proceedings on the merits, the Court of
Appeals has deprived Petitioner of its constitutionally protected day in court. Utah County
has been deprived of its day in court, access to the court and due process to determine what
the minimum qualifications for promotion to jail sergeant were in 199 land thereby whether
the Deputies should have been promoted.

Both the due process clause of article I section

7 and the open courts provision of article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that
litigants will have their day in court. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6 K 38,44 P3d
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663, 673. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution; United States Constitution 5th and 14th
Amendments. Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
The analysis to determine a denial of a day in court is the same under the due process and
open courts provisions. Miller, ^f 38. Both the due process clause of article I section 7 and
the open courts provision of article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that
litigants will have this open day in court. Due process and open court provisions dictate that
at a minimum there should be a determination of the central issues in this case, what the
minimum qualifications were for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 and why. To date, no
court has determined this issue. Utah law maintains a policy that "resolves doubts in favor
of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Celebrity Club
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293,1296 (Utah 1997) (quoting Carman
v. Slavens. 546 P.2d 601,603 (Utah 1976)). "At a minimum, a day in court means that each
party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them
properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller, If 41.
Respondent's case has not been properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and
the law as the key issues central to this case have never been decided.
The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant define what facts are relevant to the
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limitation of actions question and are determinative of the case on the merits. The Court of
Appeals failure to remand this case for this determination violates Utah County5s due process
and open court rights. If the Court finds the Deputies timely filed their grievance, the Court
should, in the alternative and in the interests of finality, determine this case on the merits, or
remand this matter to the district court to address the merits, or remand this matter giving
prospective effect only to any ruling that Petitioner should have cross appealed the district
court memorandum decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the CSC decision should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, reviewing questions of law for correctness and reversing clearly erroneous
findings of fact. In light of the CSC three month limitation of actions it was clearly
erroneous for the CSC to find that the trigger date for purposes of the three month limitation
of actions was the Deputies5 December, 1996 conversation with Sheriff Bateman. Based on
their own statements, the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action in
December of 1991 when they learned they were not promoted. There is no evidence to
support a finding that Petitioner participated in concealment or misleading conduct
preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts—1991 jail sergeant minimum
qualifications, that they were not promoted and that someone else not meeting minimum
qualifications was. The Deputies cannot satisfy the required threshold showing that they
neither knew nor should have known of their grievance before December, 1996, or a primae
facie showing of concealment or misleading conduct preventing the Deputies from
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discovering key facts during the limitation period.
Because this case does not involve a technical service, witnesses were unavailable,
Petitioner's witnesses could not remember basic facts, and evidence was lost, the application
of the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is not warranted. Estoppel is
not available against Utah County and no inconsistent statements were made within or
outside of limitation periods upon which the Deputies reasonably relied in not filing the
grievance within the three month limitation.
The Court should therefore reverse the CSC and uphold the decision of the district
court dismissing this action for the Deputies failure to timely file their grievance within three
months of its occurrence. Should the Court find the grievance was timely filed, this matter
in the alternative should be remanded to the district court to consider Utah County's other
significant arguments, or in the interests of finality determine this case on the merits, or
remand this matter giving prospective effect only to any ruling that Petitioner should have
cross appealed the district court memorandum decision.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of February, 2004*

M. CORT GRIFFIN

TV

Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner
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Tawni J. Sherman
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
Gateway Tower West
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

76

ADDENDUM

77

17-33-5

COUNTIES

(b) advise the county legislative and executive bodies
on the use of human resources;
(c) develop and implement programs for the improvement of employee effectiveness, such as training, safety,
health, counseling, and welfare;
(d) investigate periodically the operation and effect of
this law and of the policies made under it and report
findings and recommendations to the county legislative
body;
(e) establish and maintain records of all employees in
the county service, setting forth as to each employee class,
title, pay or status, and other relevant data;
(f) make an annual report to the county legislative
body regarding the work of the department; and
(g) apply and carry out this law and the policies under
it and perform any other lawful acts that are necessary to
carry out the provisions of this law.
(3) (a) (i) The director shall issue personnel rules for the
county.
(ii) The county legislative body may approve,
amend, or reject those rules before they are implemented,
(b) The rules shall provide for:
(i) recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out
in a manner that assures open competition, with
special emphasis to be placed on recruiting efforts to
attract minorities, women, handicapped, or other
groups that are substantially underrepresented in
the county work force to help assure they will be
among the candidates from whom appointments are
made;-N
(/(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, which all successful
candidates shall be required to meet in order to be
eligible for consideration for appointment or promotion;
(iii) selection procedures that include consideration of the relative merit of each applicant, a job
related method of determining the eligibility or ineligibility of each applicant, and a valid, reliable, and
objective system of ranking eligibles according to
their qualifications and merit;
(iv) certification procedures that insure equitable
consideration of an appropriate number of the most
qualified eligibles based on the ranking system;
(v) appointments to positions in the career service
by selection from the most qualified eligibles certified
on eligible lists established in accordance with Subsections (iii) and (iv);
(vi) noncompetitive appointments in the occasional instance where there is evidence that open or
limited competition is not practical, such as for unskilled positions for which there are no minimum job
requirements;
(vii) limitation of competitions at the discretion of
the director for appropriate positions to facilitate
employment of qualified applicants with a substantial physical or mental impairment, or other groups
protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act;
(viii) permanent appointment for entry to the career service which shall be contingent upon satisfactory performance by the employee during a period of
six months, with the probationary period extendable
for a period not to exceed six months for good cause,
but with the condition that the probationary employee may appeal directly to the council any undue
prolongation of the period designed to thwart merit
principles;
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(ix) temporary, provisional, or other noncareer service appointments, which may not be used as a way of
defeating the purpose of the career service and may
not exceed 90 days, with the period extendable for a
period not to exceed an additional 90 days for good
cause;
(x) lists of eligibles normally to be used, if available, for filling temporary positions, and short term
emergency appointments to be made without regard
to the other provisions of law to provide for maintenance of essential services in an emergency situation
where normal procedures are not practical, these
emergency appointments not to exceed 90 days, with
that period extendable for a period not to exceed an
additional 90 days for good cause;
^gj) promotion of employees to higher level positions in such a manner that eligible permanent
career service employees are considered and it is
adequately assured that all persons promoted are
qualified for the position;
(xii) recognition of the equivalency of other merit
processes by waiving, at the discretion of the director,
the open competitive examination for placement in
the career service positions who were originally selected through a competitive examination process in
another governmental entity, the individual in those
cases, to serve a probationary period;
(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision of a
position classification plan for all positions in the
career service, based upon similarity of duties performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the
same qualifications may reasonably be required for,
and the same schedule of pay may be equitably
applied to, all positions in the same class, the compensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality
public work force, to take into account the responsibility and difficulty of the work, the comparative pay
and benefits needed to compete in the labor market
and to stay in proper alignment with other similar
governmental units in the state, and other factors;
(xiv) keeping records of performance on all employees in the career service and requiring consideration
of performance records in determining salary increases, any benefits for meritorious service, promotions, the order of layoffs and reinstatements, demotions, discharges, and transfers;
(xv) establishment of a plan governing layoffs resulting from lack of funds or work, abolition of positions, or material changes in duties or organization,
and governing reemployment of persons so laid off,
taking into account with regard to layoffs and reemployment the relative ability, seniority, and merit of
each employee;
C(xvi)/establishment of a plan for resolving employee grievances and complaints with final and
binding decisions;
(xvii) establishment of disciplinary measures such
as suspension, demotion in rank or grade, or discharge, such measures to provide for presentation of
charges, hearing rights, and appeals for all perma*
nent employees in the career service to the career
service council;
(xviii) establishment of a procedure for employee
development and improvement of poor performance;
(xix) establishment of hours of work, holidays, and
attendance requirements in various classes of positions in the career service;
(xx) establishment and publicizing of fringe benefits such as insurance, retirement, and leave programs; and
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 65C

be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the
the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or
petition based upon a dispositive motion.
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person
forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or
franchises.
alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a
jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before competition, the court may require that notice be given to
pliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court
adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may
shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the
issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also
law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of
may place the person alleged to have been restrained in
Rule 65A.
the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(d)
Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure t o
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the
comply
with duty; actions by Board of Pardons and
respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person
other than the respondent has custody of the person Parole.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose
alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other
interests
are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in
process issued by the court may be served on the person
this
paragraph
may petition the court for relief.
having custody in the manner and with the same effect as
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be
if that person had been named as respondent in the
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative
action.
agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has ex(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone
ceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
having custody of the person alleged to be restrained
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully
person has failed to perform an act required by law as a
to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the
duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court,
sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person.
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused
The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested
the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
before the court to be dealt with according to law.
which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed
that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the
to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory
matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment
law.
accordingly. The respondent or other person having cus(3) Proceedings o n the petition. On the filing of a
tody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained
petition, the court may require that notice be given to
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court
adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may
may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before it
issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct
waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court
the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporashall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing
tion or other person named as respondent to deliver to the
order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any
court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The
misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is
court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding
the terms of Rule 65A.
to the respondent.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceed(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public auings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not
thority.
extend further than to determine whether the respondent
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The athas regularly pursued its authority.
torney general may, and when directed to do so by the (Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1,
governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds
1996.)
enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not
required to be represented by the attorney general and Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petiwho is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumertions
for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann.
ated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition
the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) C o m m e n c e m e n t a n d v e n u e . The proceeding shall be
be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if
commenced
by filing a petition with the clerk of the district
the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
court
in
the
county in which the judgment of conviction was
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A
entered.
The
petition should be filed on forms provided by the
petition filed by a person other than the attorney general
under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court
undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the
for costs and damages that may be recovered against the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) C o n t e n t s of the p e t i t i o n . The petition shall set forth
petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the
all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of
form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) G r o u n d s for relief. Appropriate relief may be the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the
granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The
or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation petition shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a
place
of incarceration;
public officer does or permits any act that results in a

lack of support for any political party, committee,
organization, agency, or person engaged in a
political activity.
5.

No officer or employee may engage in any political
activity during the hours of employment nor shall
any person solicit political contributions from
County employees during hours of employment for
political purposes, but nothing in this section
shall preclude voluntary contribution by a County
employee to the party or candidate of the
employee's choice.

6.

Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to permit partisan political activity of
any County employee who is prevented or restricted
from engaging in such political activity by the
provision of the Federal Hatch Act.

Appeal Procedure.
1.

Any Career Service employee who has completed a
Schedule B probationary period or a promotional
trial period having a grievance over merit
principles may appeal to the Career Service
Council. The employee must file a written notice
with the Personnel Director within three (3) months
from the date of the occurrence.
Procedures
outlined by the Career Service Council will then be
followed.
Exception: Career service employees
appealing discharge must do so within 10 working
days as outlined in this section (F.8.).

2.

The section regarding Constructive Discipline and
Appeal Procedure applies only to Career service
employees who have completed their probationary
period.
However, employees who are in a
promotional
trial
period
cannot
appeal
a
reassignment to their former grade and step.

Constructive Discipline and Appeal Procedure.
1.

The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to
change negative employee behavior. When discipline
can be handled in a positive manner, an employee is
less likely to feel hostile or defensive and fair
more likely to make a serious commitment to change
behavior. The "constructive" approach to employee
rHQPinlinp

i c;

fair

and

Rimnortive.

treats

the

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Hi
Deputies George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. Martin (the
deputies) appeal the trial court's order granting Utah Countyfs
petition for an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court found the deputies1
employment grievance untimely and reversed the Utah County Career
Service Council's (the Council) decision favoring the deputies.
We reverse.
BACKGROUND1
^2
In 1991, the deputies were employed by the Utah County
Sheriffs Department (the Department) as shift supervisors in the
Utah County Jail. After a reclassification study, the Department

1* "We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the
decision of the fact finder." In re B.S.V. , 2002 UT App 343,112,
57 P.3d 1127 (quotations and citation omitted). Here, the fact
finder was the Council, which ruled in favor of the deputies.

eliminated all shift supervisor positions and opened four new
sergeant positions, with a higher rank and pay than shift
supervisor. Before filling the new sergeant positions, the
Department moved the deputies and other shift supervisors to the
lower rank of corrections specialist, with no reduction in pay.
Because the duties of sergeant were similar to those of shift
supervisor, and based on representations made to them by
management, the deputies believed they would be promoted to
sergeant. Both deputies requested to be considered for the
sergeant positions. In December 1991, the Department made its
hiring decisions, and neither deputy was promoted.
%3
Although the deputies were qualified for the sergeant
position, some of those who were promoted to sergeant, as the
Council later found, did not meet minimum qualification
requirements. The deputies suspected that several of those
promoted were not qualified, but the deputies claim they did not
have access to sufficient eligibility lists and did not at that
time investigate further or pursue formal grievances.
1(4
Between 1992 and 1996, both deputies continued to express
interest in obtaining sergeant positions and participated in
testing and other evaluation procedures. In December 1996, the
deputies learned from a sergeant that a lieutenant in the
Department wanted him to manipulate the testing results involving
a separate position within the Department. After the deputies
met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss their concerns regarding
promotions and evidence of corruption within the Department, the
sheriff sent a letter to Deputy Martin dated December 17, 1996.
In that letter, Sheriff Bateman stated, for the first time, that
shift supervisors were not automatically promoted to sergeant
because the position of shift supervisor "was never a ranked
position." In fact, shift supervisor was a ranked position, and
the deputies thus discovered they had possibly not been
considered as ranked officers when applying for promotion to
sergeant.
1J5
The deputies filed a grievance with the Council on January
10, 1997, challenging the sheriff's promotion procedures and
continued failure to promote them to the rank of sergeant. The
Council consists of three members appointed by Utah County^ (the
County) legislative body, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1) (a) (I)
(2001),2 charged with hearing employment grievances filed by
county career service employees. See id. § 17-33-4(1) (b) . The
2. In 1997, the county "legislative body" appointed the
Council's members. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4 (2001)
(amendment notes). The 2001 amendments changed this to an
"executive" appointment. See id.
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County contended the grievance violated timeliness requirements
from the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and
Regulations, which require written notice of a grievance "within
three months from the date of occurrence." After hearing
evidence, on June 30, 1997, the Council concluded the grievance
petition was timely and ruled substantively in favor of the
deputies, finding that "promotions [were] based on arbitrary
criteria," with "inconsistent, biased and capricious" testing
procedures. The Council concluded that the deputies1 "discussion
with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should
drive the time for filing." Because the deputies "filed within
90 days of that date," the Council reached the substantive
issues.
%6
In July 1997, the County petitioned the trial court for an
extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, again arguing the deputies1 grievance was untimely.
The trial court remanded the case to the Council for the entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its June
30, 1997 ruling. The Council never complied with the remand
order.3 Finally, after briefing and oral argument, on September
27, 2001, the trial court found the deputies1 claims untimely as
a matter of law. The deputies now appeal that decision.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
H7
The deputies challenge the trial court's reversal of the
Council's determination that the deputies' grievance petition was
timely. Because the County brought its trial court petition
under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "this court
looks at the administrative proceeding as if the petition were
brought here directly, even though technically it is the [trial]
court's decision that is being appealed." Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "We give
no deference to the [trial] court's initial appellate review
since it was a review of the record, which this court is just as
capable of reviewing as the district court." Id.
%8
Rule 65B provides, in part, "Where no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy is available,[4] a person may petition the
3. All three original Council members were no longer on the
Council. Thus, the new Council members were not well-suited to
comply with the remand order.
4. The Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4 in 2001
by adding a procedure for appeals of Council decisions to the
(continued...)
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court for extraordinary relief . . . . where an . . .
administrative agency . . . has . . . abused its discretion."
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d) (2) (A) . A rule 65B abuse of
discretion hinges on whether the Council "misused11 or "exceeded"
its discretion. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
"However, as noted by both this court and the Utah Supreme Court,
1
abuse of discretion1 for [r]ule 65B(d) (2) (A) writs must be much
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion'
featured in routine appellate review." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d
918, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Renn v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)). For example, in Stirba,
this court found that a "simple mistake of law does not qualify
as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary
for a [r]ule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue."5 Id. at 923. Thus, we
will reverse the Council's legal conclusion regarding its
timeliness rule only if it is a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion. We review any underlying factual findings under a
clearly erroneous standard. See Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White,
2002 UT App 1,^11, 40 P.3d 1155.
ANALYSIS
%9
The County argues the Council misapplied its timeliness rule
for hearing appeals. Section VII E.l of the Utah County Office
of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations provides, "Any
career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary
period . . . having a grievance over merit principles may appeal
to the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written
notice with the personnel director within three months from the
date of the occurrence." Here, the Council concluded that the
deputies1 "discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was
4. (.,.continued)
trial courts, see id. at § 17-33-4 (1) (d) (2001) (amendment
notes), but this was not in effect in 1997 when the County first
petitioned for an extraordinary writ.
5. The County argues this court's rule 65B abuse of discretion
analysis in State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
applies only to cases where an appeal is statutorily prohibited.
We disagree. In Stirba, this court separately discussed a
statutory limit placed on the State's right to appeal. See id.
at 923. Further, we cited Indian Vill. Trading Post, Inc. v.
Bench, 929 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) in support of our rule
65B abuse of discretion analysis. See Stirba, 972 P*2d at 923.
Bench did not involve a statutory limit of appeal. See 929 P 2d
at 370 (discussing use of rule 65B to "compel correction of a
public officer's gross abuse of discretion" (emphasis added)).
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the date that should drive the time for filing," and that because
the deputies "filed within 90 days of that date," their petition
was timely.
HlO Implicit in this determination is a factual finding that the
deputies were not reasonably aware of their grievance until their
December 1996 discussion with the sheriff. The deputies first
learned in December 1996 that Sheriff Bateman erroneously
believed the position of shift supervisor "was never a ranked
position." Prior to December 1996, the deputies did not know,
and had no reason to know, of the possibility that they were
personally passed over for promotion because of an incorrect
assumption regarding their qualifications. Thus, the Council's
implicit factual finding was not clearly erroneous.6
Ull Moreover, because the Council had reason to believe the
deputies were not reasonably aware of their employment grievance
until December 1996, the Council did not grossly and flagrantly
abuse its discretion in concluding, as a matter of law, that the
grievance's "date of . . . occurrence" was in December 1996.
Therefore, the Council's legal conclusion that the deputies1
grievance was timely was not a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion.7
6. Although lower tribunals should make explicit factual
findings, the "'failure to make factual findings is not
reversible error'" where, as here, "the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding
in favor of the judgment.1" American Fork City v. Singleton,
2002 UT App 331,1(8, 57 P. 3d 1124 (quoting Acton v. Deli ran, 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). Here, the County does not dispute
that, in December 1996, the deputies first learned of the
sheriff's erroneous assumption regarding the status of the shift
supervisor position.
Furthermore, any remand to the Council for factual findings
would not be helpful in this case. The trial court
unsuccessfully attempted such a remand, and the Council members
who sat on this case are no longer available or with the Council.
7. Furthermore, even if the Council technically deviated from
its rule, it was still within rule 65B parameters. Cf. Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d at 876, 879
(Utah 1992), superceded on other grounds, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) (concluding appellate courts should
"uphold reasonable and rational departures" from an agency's own
rules, "absent a showing that the departure violated some other
right" (emphasis added)). The Council must be "in sympathy with
the application of merit principles" to career service
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
Ul2 We conclude the Council did not grossly and flagrantly abuse
its discretion in allowing the deputies' appeal under its
timeliness rule. We therefore reverse the trial courtfs ruling.8

Judith M. Billings, Judge

1l3

^

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson ,£/
Presiding Judge

^ - J

James/2/7 Davis, J>p9ge

7. ( . . .continued)
employment, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1) (a) (i) , and the three
month timeliness requirement stems from a procedural and internal
personnel rule. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10 (2001). Given the
deputies1 new information and the Council's finding that the
Department's promotions were arbitrary, the Council could have
equitably decided to slightly deviate from its timeliness rule.
8. At oral argument, the County urged us to alternatively remand
this case to the trial court for findings on the me^rits.
However, in its memorandum decision reversing the Council's
timeliness decision, the trial court clearly upheld the Council's
conclusions on the merits, and the County has filed no cross
appeal. Specifically, the trial court stated, " [T"| his court is
persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support [the
deputies'] claim that the County deviated from a regular process
of promotion based on merit principles. Therefore, the finding
of the Council on this issue will not be overturned."
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FSLED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

\fzfoz*

m\

Deputy

M. CORT GRIFFIN (4583)
Deputy Utah County Attorney
KAY BRYSON (0473)
Utah County Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent
100 East Center, Suite 2400
Provo, IJT 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8001
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELEEF

vs.
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON,
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Respondents.

:
:
:

Case No. 970400590
Honorable Fred D. Howard

:

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing as regularly scheduled on the 27th day of July,
2001 at 1:30 p.m. before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. Petitioner, Utah County, was represented
by its attorney of record, M. Cort Griffin, and Sheriff David Bateman was present on behalf of
Petitioner. Respondents were present and represented by their attorney of record, Stephen W Cook.
The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and having taken this matter under advisement,
and having considered the relevant pleadings, memoranda of the parties and the record, and being
fully advised in the premises HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:

That the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the above entitled matter is hereby granted The
decision of the Utah County Career Service Council in this matter is respectfully reversed and
Respondents' claims are hereby dismissed for Respondents failure to timely file their grievances
before the Utah County Career Service Council.
DATED this @£_ day of

cffild/10i&/,

2001.
BY THE'

ri&SS&fa

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Petition for
Extraordinary Relief to the below named party at the address set forth below, this \c~) ""day of
December, 2001.
Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

m*3\.(lana &>
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,

vs.

Case U 970400590 AA

GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON,
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Hon. Fred D. Howard
Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came before the court on the Petitioner's Motion for Extraordinary
Relief. The court having reviewed the Petition, and the Respondent's Objection thereto; and the court
having considered the relevant documents and the parties' respective arguments makes the following
decision.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
I.

Standard of Review
Under UtahKCiv.P. 65B(d)(2)(A), this court may grant appropriate relief "where an inferior

court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicialfiinctionshas exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion." This court acts as an appellate court and will accord the Career Services
Council (hereafter, the Council) broad deference in itsfindingsof fact, but will review the Council's
conclusions of law for correctness.

1

H.

Merit Principles
In its June 30, 1997, letter of decision to Deputies Martin and Alexanderson, the Council

specifically found that "promotions were based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing procedures
appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some employees were
promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies."
The Council did not make specific citations to the record to support its findings.
The record and pleadings in this case are voluminous and this court will not attempt to reiterate point by point the evidence in support and contrary to the Council'sfindings.After iully
reviewing the transcript of the Council hearings, and the pleadingsfiledby both parties, this court
finds sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that the testing procedures were at best
inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative
of merit principles.
Of specific concern to the court is the use of the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual (PPM)
by the County. The County argues that the JPPM is advisory and not binding between the County and
its employees. While such an argument may attempt to place the County on firm legal ground, it
cannot do so where the JPPM was used as a sword against employees and a shield to protect the
Countyfromliability. In this matter, officer employees were expected to "have read and expressed
their clear understanding of the material to the satisfaction of the Jail Training Officer," even though
it had no legal effect whatsoever. The court is persuaded that the manner in which the JPPM was

2
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utilized communicated to officer employees that it could be relied upon despite the disclaimer. It is
the County's position that while the JPPM is non-binding and can be changed at any time, an
employee is expected to know and understand all of this non-binding material Such an approach is
inherently unfair as illustrated with the following examples.
Section 150.0 states that "the retention and promotion of all jail staff members will be based
on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications, and competitive examinations." To the
deputies' assertion that this provision was violated, the County responds that even if it was, it does
not matter because it was not binding in any case. Assuming the County is correct, however, this
circumstance leaves the deputy applicant unable to assess what he or she nees to do to qualify for
promotion. It is reasonable for the deputy to believe that the policies described in the JPPM will be
followed; and if are not binding, the county has an obligation to give adequate advance notice to
employees of where they intend to varyfromthe JPPM directions.
Another example is §150.2(1) which states that "all staff members who desire promotion will
be subject to (a) written examination, (b) oral interviews and (c) review evaluations and length of
service." The County argues that the phrase "subject to" means that while the County may use these
criteria in the promotion process it is not required to because it is given discretion and flexibility.
Further, it contends that even if it does mean they must consider such criteria, no violation of merit
principles occurred because this provision is not binding. However, the court is unpersuaded by such
argument because again, a deputy is unable to assess what criteria will be utilized in the promotion

3
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process notwithstanding published JPPM criteria. Numerous other illustrations of conflict and
contradiction with the use of the JPPM and the promotion process are contained in the parties'
pleadings.
In addition to the preceding, the court also notes the argument ofthe Petitioner that ultimately
it is unimportant whether the promotion process differsfromone hiring to the next so long as all of
the individual applicants are equally treated within the same promotion process. The court strongly
disagrees with this argument. Such an argument ignores the possibility that the playing field can be
slanted before the process even begins. With the promotion requirements in a constant state of flux,
applicants are unable to reasonably and accurately assess the testing procedures and the subjective
weight given to each of the promotion criteriafromone hiring to the next. The applicants are unable
to reasonably forecast the promotion qualifications and make advance preparations for his or her
application. Further, the process is subject to manipulation to favor or prevent qualified individuals
from acquiring promotions for reasons other than merit principles.
Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on merit
principles. Therefore, the finding of the Council on this issue will not be overturned.
HI.

Statute of Limitations
The court next examines the question of whether as a matter of law, Respondents' claims are

barred by the statute of limitations. In its letter decision the Council stated that "we did not feel like
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this hearing should be barred because of the issue of timeliness. We felt like your discussion with
Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time forfiling.You filed within
90 days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing." This decision is a conclusion of law
that must be reviewed for correctness.
By their own claim, Respondents expected that all shift supervisors would be promoted to
Sargent after the 1991 salary survey. Neither Respondent was promoted, a fact known by each of
them in 1991. The cause of action of each Respondent arose at that time, the time of their nonpromotion.
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations
states:
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to
the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written notice with the
personnel director within three months of the date of the occurrence.
Utah case law holds that "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations
begin to run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple ignorance
of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations." Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). In this
matter, the record is clear that the statute of limitations period began when Respondents were passed
over for promotion in 1991. By express ordinance rule, they were tofiletheir grievance complaint
within three months of such occurrence. They failed to bring their claim within the three months of
5

the alleged grievance.
After careful review of the parties' authorities and argument on this subject, the court, is
persuaded that the Council erroneously relied on the December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman
as the "occurrence" that commenced the statute of limitations period. The court is unpersuaded by
the circumstances of this case that the conversation with Sheriff Bateman renewed the limitations
time period. Respondents' request that past grievances be "looked into" cannot be considered an
"occurrence" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Otherwise, as correctly noted by
Petitioner, anytime an aggrieved party requested reconsideration, the limitations time period would
begin to run anew thus defeating public policies of the statute of limitations entirely.
Among other things, the statute of limitations prevents the "revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." Sew v. Security Title. 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995). A review of the hearing
transcript persuasively reveals that such described dangers are present in this case - documents have
been destroyed, witnesses are unable to remember important events, and other important witnesses
cannot be located.
There is no factual dispute that Respondents failed to properly raise their claim within three
months of the alleged grievance. The record is also void of facts that would allow this court to apply
the discovery,fraudulentconcealment or the exceptional circumstances exceptions. For these reasons,
and those stated in Petitioner's memoranda, the statute of limitations has long passed and

6
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Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is granted.
While there is merit to Respondents' claims that the County's promotion process is inconsistent,
arbitrary and violative of merit principles, Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law by the
Statute of Limitations.
The decision of the Career Services Council is respectfully reversed and Respondents' claims
dismissed. Counsel for Petitioner is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling and subnut it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to final submission to the Court for signature.

DATED this ^ T ^ d a y of !s%dL> 2001
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that true copies of the foregoing order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the ^ *

day

of September 2001 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit:

Stephen W.Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
M. Court Griffin
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2400
Provo, UT 84606

i'/Jl

Deputy Clerk
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UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL

CHARLES MARTIN

:

RULING

GEORGE ALEXANDERSON
Appellant,
vs.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT
Employer

:

The previous Utah County Career Service Council, (none of whom are still on the
Council) heard the case and entered a decision. Utah Countyfileda petition for extraordinary
relieffromthat decision. The Court, in or about October 27, 1997 entered an Order of Remand
to the Council. The Council reviewed the record and filed a response. The Court ruled the
Councils response inadequate and directed, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, a satisfactory
response to the Remand Order.
The existing Council has spent many hours with this case, reviewing written record and
attempting to understand the audio tape record, which in many parts is "inaudible". After
completing its review, this Council is unanimous in its disagreement with the prior Council's
decision.
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The Order of Remand dated October 27, 1997, permits and directs this Council, in its
discretion, to:

iii.

Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary or desirable;

v.

Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it may deem
necessary or desirable; and

vi.

Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem necessary or
desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceeding for eventual review by
this Court.

Upon completion of the foregoing, this Court would then perform its review in
accordance with applicable law as requested by Utah County in its petition for extraordinary
relief
As directed, the present Council now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

A Classification Study occurred and was completed on July 15, 1991, where the
title of Shift Supervisor was eliminated. In response to this change Sergeant
2

*

positions were created at the jail
When the title of shift supervisor was eliminated, those who had such jobs
continued working as Correction Specialists with no change in grade or salary.
Martin and Alexanderson who had been Shift Supervisors applied to become
Sergeants in 1991 and were not promoted.
Deputy Martin wrote a letter in April 1992, explaining how he felt about the
process of choosing Sergeants. No formal grievance wasfiledat that time.
Application were taken for various Sergeant positions between 1991 and 1996.
Martin and/or Alexanderson applied for some, but not all of those positions. They
were not promoted. No grievance wasfiledfor any of those hiring decisions.
A meeting was held on December 17, 1996, at which Martin and Alexanderson
explained to Sheriff Bateman theirfrustrationwith hiring decisions made between
1991 and 1996. Bateman prepared a memorandum of that meeting dated
December 30, 1996, addressing their concerns.
Grievance dated January 10, 1997, wasfiledafter reviewing Sheriff Bateman's
memo dated December 30, 1996, by Martin and Alexanderson.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The grievance of George Aiexanderson and Charles Martin dated January 10, 1997 was
not timely and is dismissed. Any prior contraryfindingor conclusion of the previous Council is
vacated.

Respectfully,

CTsherlynrTFen:

County Career Service Council Chair

f£7-2#a

Date

*^<^r

loyd Evans - Utah County Career Service Council

inson - Utah County Career Service Council

Date

Date
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage
prepaid theron this OSi day of M-pH I , "ZOCO » t o the following:
Charles Martin
487 North 1080 East
Orem, UT 84057
George Alexanderson
P.O. Box 706
American Fork, UT 84003
•Stephen W.Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center
Provo, UT 84606
Utah County Sheriff
3075 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

,4wh K^--^ te-7km
Sarah Ruiz
\~~~~JE>ate
Career Service Council Secretary
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Career Service Council
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200
Prove-, UT 84606

November 22,1999

Deputy George S. Alexanderson
P.O. Box 706
American Fork, UT 84003
Charles H. Martin
487 North 1080 East
Orem,UT 84057
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo,UT 84606
Stephen W.Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE: Fourth Judicial District Court / Case #: 970400590
To the above parties:
The Career Service Council has reviewed the documents on file in this informally administered
case. None of the current members of the council were involved in the hearings or the decision
rendered in this matter. After review, the council determines the previous decision dated June
30,1997, is a "final decision" in this matter as contemplated by UCA 63-46b-5(i).
All proceedings in this matter were conducted informally according to the history and practice of
the Career Service Council. The informal record is, in significant parts, unintelligible and
impossible to review.
The council determines that the appeal for judicial review of this informal proceeding be
pursuant to UCA 63-46b-15.
1
4

Sincerely,

Lloyd Evans - Career Service Council

j±]%2$
Mark F. Robinson - Career Service Council

Date
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David L. Blackner, Utah State Bar No. 5376
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER
Attorney for Respondents
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3480

91 c:

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,
Petitioner,
vs.

; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND REMANDING MATTER
• TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL
!

GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Respondents.

'. Case No.: 970400590
! Judge: The Honorable Howard H. Maetani

Respondents Alexanderson and Martin's motion to dismiss petitioner Utah
County's petition for extraordinary relief came on for hearing before the Court on
October 1, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Howard H. Maetani presiding. Respondents
were represented in person at the hearing by their counsel, David L. Blackner. Petitioner
was represented in person at the hearing by its counsel, M. Cort Griffin.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, and having heard
arguments on the matter, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
a. That respondents5 motion to dismiss the petition is hereby denied.

i

b. That this matter be remanded to the Utah County Career Service Council (the
"Council") for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its
decision of June 30,1997, but that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter
pending the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Council.
c. That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Council may, among other things, as it, in its discretion, may elect:
i.

Request that one, both, or neither of the parties prepare proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law for adoption by the
Council;

ii.

Hear any objections to such proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law as it may choose to hear and consider;

iii.

Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary
or desirable;

iv.

Take such further testimony, or accept such further evidence, as it
may deem necessary or desirable;

v.

Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it
may deem necessary or desirable; and

vi.

Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the
proceedings for eventual review by this Court,

d. That petitioner Utah County arrange for, and bear the cost of, the preparation
of a hearing transcript by a certified court reporter and that such transcript be provided to

2

the Council in connection with the preparation of such findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
e. That upon the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
Council, and the delivery of the record to the Court, this Court will then perform its
review thereof in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its
petition for extraordinary relief
DATED this ^

day of October, 1997.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ( y? day of October, 1997,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REMANDING MATTER TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL by first
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
M. Cort Griffin
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400
Provo,Utah 84606
Utah County Career Service Council
Merrit Fullmer, Council Secretary
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200
Provo,Utah 84606
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June 30, 1997

Deputy George S. Alexanderson
P.O. Box 607
American Fork, UT 84003
Deputy Charles H. Martin
487 N. 1080 E.
Orem, UT 84603
Dear Deputies Martin and Alexanderson,
Thank you for your patience in awaiting a reply regarding your grievance hearing. As a
Career Service Council we felt like we needed to take the time to review your case carefully. The
following is an outline of your statement of relief and our recommendation resulting from the
hearing.
1)

Retroactive reinstatement to the rank of Sergeant (formerly named Shift
Supervisor), non-probationary and competent level

The council does not recommend that you be reinstated to the rank of Sergeant because
you never achieved that rank. However, we do recommend that you both be promoted to the
Sergeant's rank, effective immediately.
2)

Appropriate Reparations
a)
Back Pay at Sergeants level of compensation
b)
Attorneys Fees and Costs

In addition to the promotion to Sergeant, the council recommends pay at the Sergeant's
level retroactive to December 9, 1991, when the first promotions to Sergeants became effective
after the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated. We recommend that the county take into
consideration appropriate Cost of Living Allowance when calculating retroactive pay. The pay
should not include merit increases and other possible related benefits commensurate with the rank
of Sergeant.
The council is unable to make a ruling on the attorneys fees and costs because it is outside
our scope of authority,
3)

Implementation of Standardized and Unbiased Testing Procedures

It appears that promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing
procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some
employees were promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in

the various policies.
The council recommends that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with each
other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefUlly followed.
4)

Written Admission and Apology, to be placed in Deputies personnel files, that
failure to give Deputies earned rank of Sergeant was an oversight

The council believes a written admissions and apology is not necessary. The above
outlined recommendations should be adequate to substantiate and resolve your concerns.
In addition to the above statement of relief, the council would also like to address the
concern brought up by you regarding your statement that you were not promoted because you are
not members of the Mormon faith. The council feels there was insufficient evidence to support
this.
The council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should be
barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with Sheriff Bateman in
December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 90 days of that
date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing.
Again, thank you for your patience in bringing this issue to resolution.
.Sincerely,

Deborah L. Gateley, Utah County Career Service Council

Date

t>/Ww

R y p R. Beuhring, Utah Coumy Career Service Council~\\ 7
cc:

Kay Bryson - Utah County Attorney
personnel file

Date
7rwTT

UTAH COUNTY

Class T i t l e : Sergeant

Class Code::
HO&C
Effective Date:
~
Grade Number:
\k^
/fT

GENERAL PURFOSE

Under the general supervision of Lieutenant, perrorms sipervisory ana
t e c h n i c a l police work.
EXAMPLE OF DUTIES

A-

J a i l Sergeant
Supervises the Correctional S p e c i a l i s t s , Correctional Counselor, Head
J a i l Matron, and J a i l Matrons t o insure s e c u r i t y of the prison,
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i c h t s and safety of inmates, and adherence to j a i l
p r a c t i c e s and procedures; runs the lineup room; books, e s c o r t s , and
r e l e a s e s prisoners; operates control room, including camera monitors,
control panel and computer; maintains records of i n c i d e n t s , visitations,,
medications and bookings and submits t o the J a i l Lieutenant; purchases
medical equipment ana supplies; insures proper maintenance of equipment
and prison f a c i l i t y ; operates firearms, b r e a t h a l i z e r , radar equipment,
and 2-way radio; performs other related d u t i e s as assigned,

B.

Detective Sergeant
Supervises Detectives and performs technical work i n the investigation of
crime; makes case assignments t o subordinates; a s s i s t s , advises and
evaluates cases assigned; reviews cases referred by Patrol Division;
reviews case reports submitted by Detectives; maintains own caseload,
c o l l e c t s evidence, interviews victims and witnesses, photographs crime
scenes, develops informants, and writes r e p o r t s ; t e s t i f i e s in court as
necessary; schedules personnel for time off t o insure an adequate number
of detectives available for each c a s e ; operates photographic equipment,
undercover surveillance equipment, firearms, k i t s for field testing of
n a r c o t i c s and fingerprinting; performs other r e l a t e d duties as assigned.

C.

Patrol Sergeant
Supervises Deputy Sheriffs and performs d u t i e s of a p a t r o l officer to
insure maintenance of highway and public safety for unincorporated areas
and contraced incorporated c i t i e s ; evaluates, t r a i n s , advises and directs
subordinates in t h e i r work; serves as s h i f t commander and coordinates and
d i r e c t s assigned department operations; has delegated responsibility for
the provision of effective and e f f i c i e n t s e r v i c e s ; plans and schedules
personnel for routine and unusual purposes during s h i f t s ; coordinates and
supervises volunteer search and rescue teams; provides input into the
preparation of division budget, policies and procedures- Enforces laws

pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles on Utah public highways;
directs and controls traffic; performs other police duties including
making arrests, testifying in court, writing reports and issuing
citations; operates firearms, radar gun, and emergency search and rescue
equipment; performs other related duties as assigned.
D,

Other Sergeants may be assigned duties similar to those listed above in
categories A, B, and C.

MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS
1.

Education and Experience:
Four (4) years of experience as a deputy s h e r i f f or detective.

2.

Special Requirements:
P.OoS.T. C e r t i f i c a t i o n ; q u a l i f y i n g score on the Sergeant's examination,

3.

Necessary Knowledge, S k i l l s , and A b i l i t i e s :
Considerable knowledge o f laws, ordinances, and regulations on
highways, t r a f f i c d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l , r e c o g n i t i o n , c o l l e c t i o n ,
p r e p a r a t i o n , preservation, and laws o f evidence; considerable
knowledge o f criminal law and techniques o f c o u r t procedure;
considerable knowledge of recording and r e p o r t i n g of a c t i v i t i e s ;
considerable knowledge o f mechanics and techniques of a r r e s t ;
considerable knowledge of accident i n v e s t i g a t i o n and r e p o r t i n g ;
considerable knowledge of p r i n c i p l e s , methods, and techniques of
e f f e c t i v e t r a i n i n g , s u p e r v i s i o n , and personnel p r a c t i c e s .
S k i l l i n the operation o f firearms and o t h e r equipment related to
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , highway and p u b l i c s a f e t y , and c o r r e c t i o n .
A b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h working r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the general p u b l i c ,
community p r o f e s s i o n a l s , i n t r a and interdepartmental personnel;
a b i l i t y to accurately assess and take e f f e c t i v e action i n emergencies;
a b i l i t y t o communicate e f f e c t i v e l y , v e r b a l l y and i n w r i t i n g .

CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES
1.

Knowledge and T r a i n i n g :
(see above)

2.

Accountability:
Work is controlled by practices and procedures which are covered by
well defined policy which could result in loss of or damage to
equipment, and lessen security in the community.

3.

D i f f i c u l t y of Work:
Work consists of unusual and d i f f i c u l t circumstances requiring
judgment and moderate mental demand to choose appropriate methods

Personal Contacts:
Contacts are non-routine and involve inmates, the general public,
intra and interdepartmental personnel and community professionals for
the purpose of moderately complex problem solving.
Supervision Exercised:
May supervise and be responsible for work accomplishment of up to
twelve (12) employees; schedules and assigns work; makes recommendations for hiring and disciplinePhysical Effort:
Effort is minimal and ranges from sitting or standing to considerable
lifting, pushing, pulling, crouching or stooping in the performance
of police work.
Working Conditions:
Working conditions are adequate. However, work involves recurring
exposure to hazards which involve chance of major injury or death;
traveling in an automobile may be required. May be required to respond for emergencies 24 hours a day.

ITFAH COUNTY JOB DESCRIPTION

CLASS TITLES

Sergeant/Jail Operations

CLASS CODE: 3091
EFFECTIVE DATE; l^3^f(

GRADE NUMBER:

*>A/ m*J~_* ^ „h Q7\
*W
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DEPARTMENT: Sheriff, Jail
SUPERVISOR TITLE: Lieutenant
LOCATION: Sheriff
DATE PREPARED:

12-16-91

JOB SUMMARY
Responsible to supervise, coordinate, schedule, certified correctional
staff, jail civilian staff, and supervise inmates. Insures prisoner righl
are maintained and jail policy and procedures are followed, through
actively motivating staff. Responsible for processing inmate requests,
grievances, and disciplinary hearings. Investigates and recommends change
on criminal activity committed by inmates. Classifies inmates according
state law. Processes special requests regarding inmates. May act as a
team leader for specific assignments.
ACTIVITIES AND PERCENT OF TIME
PERCENT OF
TIME

ACTIVITY

Percent of time for each activity may vary according to assignment.
30

Inmate grievance, disciplinary hearings, requests. Responds
to formal inmate requests. Holds inmate disciplinary
hearings. Handles inmate grievances. Monitors daily inmate
behavior. Responds to questions and complaints and monitors
general condition of the facility. Resolves inmate problems
Contacts Adult Probation and Parole, courts, and judges with
results of inmate disciplinary hearings and incidents.

25

Inmate classification. Conducts detailed classification
interview within first 72 hours of incarceration. Reviews
classification forms completed at booking. Refers medical
problems to medical staff. Interviews persons with history
mental illness or suicide attempt to determine best housing
options and refer to mental health services. Review crimina
history of inmates. Completes transportation risk assessmen
on all inmates booked. Figures release dates. Computes goo
time for early release. Determines appropriate housing for
inmates at booking and as court status changes.

30

Correction staff supervision, relief staff duties. Schedule
evaluates, disciplines correction staff. Reviews shift logs

UTAH COUNTY JOB DESCRIPTION
Sergeant/Jail Operations, Sheriff
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A b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h e f f e c t i v e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h employees t o
t r a i n , s u p e r v i s e , d i r e c t , and c o o r d i n a t e work.
A b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h working r e l a t i o n s h i p s with t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c ,
c o m m u n i t y p r o f e s s i o n a l s , i n t r a and i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l p e r s o n n e l . A b i l i t y t o
a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s and t a k e e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n i n e m e r g e n c i e s . A b i l i t y t o
c o m m u n i c a t e e f f e c t i v e l y v e r b a l l y and i n w r i t i n g .
A b i l i t y t o a c t as i n t e r i m
E m e r g e n c y Commander a s n e e d e d .
A b i l i t y t o i n t e r p r e t v a r i o u s c r i m i n a l documents;
court dockets, a r r e s t
r e p o r t s , c r i m i n a l h i s t o r i e s . Working knowledge of i n m a t e r i g h t s .
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
R e q u i r e s c u r r e n t POST C e r t i f i c a t i o n and c u r r e n t CPR c e r t i f i c a t i o n .
R e q u i r e s BS d e g r e e i n c l u d i n g 30 s e m e s t e r h o u r s i n p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y ,
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , or c l o s e l y r e l a t e d f i e l d .
REQUIRED WORK EXPERIENCE
R e q u i r e s 3 y e a r s j o b r e l a t e d work e x p e r i e n c e w i t h d e m o n s t r a t e d
Must p a s s background check.

competence

DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING
D e c i s i o n s a r e made i n an e n v i r o n m e n t of p e r s o n a l and County l i a b i l i t y .
D e c i d e s h o u s i n g a s s i g n m e n t f o r i n m a t e s . Judgment e r r o r s can r e s u l t i n
i n m a t e i n j u r y or d e a t h .
Decides s e c u r i t y arrangements t o t r a n s p o r t inmates
b a s e d on p r o b a b l e r i s k .
A s s i g n s , s c h e d u l e s , m o n i t o r s , and e v a l u a t e s
correction staff.
S o l v e s p r o b l e m s when c o m p l a i n t s a r i s e .
Determines
n e e d e d p u r c h a s e of s u p p l i e s and e q u i p m e n t . May a c t i v a t e s p e c i a l emergency
teams.
INTERACTION WITH OTHERS
I n t e r a c t s w i t h i n m a t e s , f a m i l y of i n m a t e , o t h e r p o l i c e a g e n c i e s , b a i l
b o n d s m e n , c o u r t c l e r k s , j u d g e s , A d u l t - P r o b a t i o n and P a r o l e O f f i c e r s ,
a t t o r n e y s , o t h e r County d e p a r t m e n t s , mental h e a l t h programs, o t h e r
c o r r e c t i o n s o f f i c i a l s , v e n d o r s , and t h e p u b l i c .
WORKING ENVIRONMENT
Physical:
R o t a t i n g 24 hour s h i f t work w i t h o n - c a l l d u t i e s .
Jail
f a c i l i t i e s h a v e l i t t l e n a t u r a l l i g h t , poor t e m p e r a t u r e c o n t r o l , and crowde
work s p a c e s .
Exposed t o communicable d i s e a s e s .
Mental:
Exposure t o i n t o x i c a t e d , b e l l i g e r e n t , mentally unstable
inmates.
Emergency s i t u a t i o n s a r i s e w e e k l y , s o m e t i m e s d a i l y ; c e l l b l o c k
d i s t u r b a n c e s , f i g h t s , a s s a u l t s , p o t e n t i a l s u i c i d e s , and i n m a t e i n j u r i e s S t a f f s h o r t a g e s mean S e r g e a n t i s p u l l e d from r e g u l a r d u t i e s t o p e r f o r m
correction staff duties.
F r e q u e n t i n t e r r u p t i o n s from c o m p l a i n t s , problems:
s u p e r v i s o r s c a n ' t h a n d l e , d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s from c a l l e r s , e t c .
Receives
p h o n e c a l l s a t home when o f f - d u t y for p r o b l e m s .

127,03

JAIL SERGEANT (ON-LINE)
A.

General Classification:
1.

B.

V^-j
Dej

Category I Police Stat

Duties and Responsibilities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1011.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16s
17,

Supervises the jail operation in the absence
of the Jail Commander and the Administrative
Sergeant.
Reports to the Jail Commander on all
operations of the Jail.
Supervises the on-line jail activities
controlling security, safety, and care of all
the inmates and jail staff.
Supervises shift supervisors who act as
officers in charge when the Jail Administration is off duty.
Supervises the correctional nurses and
coordinates the Jail Health program.
Supervises the dayshift Control Room
Personnel, Secretary, and Control Board
Operator.
Coordinates with out of state agencies
concerning the inmate extradition process.
Conducts employee evaluation and disciplinary
actions.
Developes Standard Operating Procedures
(S.O.P.'s) pertaining to security operations
in the jail.
Prepares all shift scheduling, including
vacation, holiday, sick time, and
emergencies.
Coordinates maintenance work projects with
County Personnel assigned to the Jail.
Screens all booking sheets and other jail
business to ensure correct booking records,
billing agencies and other documentation.
Screens the daily shift logs of each shift to
ensure proper working procedures and
security requirements are being adhered to.
Investigates and prosecutes all criminal
activity committed in the Jail by inmates.
Acts as chairman of the Jail Disciplinary
Board,
Answer all inmate grievances and forwards
the complaints to the Jail Commander for
review.
Coordinate with the Correctional Counselor
in the classification of all inmates
entering the Jail.

,)
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150.00

Reteirtxon and Promotion of Jail Employees

(P-14)

The retention and promotion of all Jail Staff members
will be based on the demonstration of merit, specified
qualifications and competitive examinations without
regard to race, religion, sex or national origin.
All personnel actions will be carried out rationally,
impartially, and according to the law.
150.01

County Personnel Employee Status Rules
All jail staff members will be governed under the Rules
and Regulations Section IV. "Employer Status, Probation
and Promotion," including any Sheriff's additional
policies for uniform merit personnel.
Example of Change: 1. Utah County Deputy Sheriff
probationary period is one (1) year, instead of a six
(6) month probation period as for other non-uniformed
county employees.

150.02

Personal Advancement

(P-3)

Staff members who desire promotional advancement must
obtain certain levels of proficiency according to the
various work assignment^ and the length of service time
with the Division.
All staff members who desire promotion in the jail
will be subject to:
a.
b.
c.

VZritten examination
Oral interview
Review of evaluations and length of service

Staff who are on probationary status are not
elegible for promotional advancement.
The length of time served will be a basis for
eligibility for the following positions-

rl

a.

Shift Supervisor - One (1) year fulltime
employment and removed from probation.

b.

Sergeant - Three (3) years of Correctional
Experience, including one (1) year as a Shift
Supervisor o —
:J*

c.

Lieutenant ~ Six (6) years of employment with
the Utah County Sheriff's Office, including
three (3) years in the rank of Sergeant in the
Utah County Jail.

